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

SOLDIERS SAILORS & CIVILIANS

The "Military Mind" & the All-Volunteer Force

Jerald G. Bachman
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Ann Arbor, Michigan
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PREFACE

What kinds of individuals will staff an all-volunteer military in the United States during the 1970s and beyond? That question has been a major focus for a series of policy-relevant research studies begun by the Institute for Social Research in 1968 and extending through 1975. The present monograph draws on a number of these studies; in particular, it presents the results of a three-year exploration of perceptions and preferences about the military based on large-scale surveys of soldiers, sailors and civilians.

We view this as an instance of policy-relevant research because we consider the staffing and ideological make-up of the all-volunteer armed forces to be important national policy issues, and because we feel that the kinds of data we present here can help to make policy analyses and decisions better-informed. Our own viewpoints about the military have doubtless influenced our choice of research issues; on the other hand, we have tried to be objective in our analyses and have reported our findings extensively in text and appendices so that those with different points of view can examine the evidence in considerable detail. (For those whose reading time is more limited, we have also provided a concise summary of the findings as a part of our first chapter.)

Let us be clear about some of our own biases right from the start. We prefer that the armed forces be fundamentally responsive to civilian leadership, that they be well-integrated with the larger civilian society, and that they be staffed by a broadly representative cross-section of individuals reflecting a rich diversity of ideological perspectives. In other words, we seek to avoid what has been termed a "separate military ethos." This point of view is a value judgement on our part, not something which can be demonstrated by survey research findings. As a matter of fact, our results suggest that this issue did not (as of 1973) worry the average citizen very much. But for those of us who do feel some concern about such things, the findings reported here tell us something about what the impact of all-volunteer conditions is likely to be upon ideology within the military.

Stated briefly, our research indicates that, if present practices for recruiting and retaining military personnel are continued, there is likely to be a gradual trend toward a more career-oriented military and a corresponding tendency toward a narrower "pro-military ideology" within the services. Our findings also suggest some steps which can be taken to arrest and even reverse the trend. But the decision as to whether the trend should be reversed is not something which derives from research but rather from the complex process of national leadership. As we said before, our purpose has been to make that process better-informed.

* * *

Our involvement in this particular area of research developed along separate and rather different paths. Bachman's interest grew out of a longitudinal study of youth (Youth in Transition); as an outgrowth of that project, he and Jerome Johnston began (in 1968) some fairly extensive analyses of young men's views and personal decisions about the military. That led to a three-year collaboration with David Bowers, funded first by the U.S. Office of Naval Research (1972-74) and then by the U.S. Army Research Institute (1974-75), which generated the data reported here.

While Bachman was studying aspects of the military from a safe and detached vantage point in the Institute for Social Research, Blair was studying the military as a participant-observer--his graduate studies in sociology had been interrupted by a tour of duty in the Army (1968-71). The experience prompted an interest in military sociology, and eventually led to a full-time analysis and writing collaboration with Bachman (in 1974-75).

In preparing this summary report, we have drawn on a number of our earlier works, some authored separately and others authored jointly. Our contributions have been different, and differently distributed through time, but we share an equal responsibility for the present monograph. As a result, there is really no senior author; rather, the listing of names is alphabetical.

A number of our colleagues contributed heavily to this work by reviewing portions of the text, providing advice on data analysis, collaborating in research and instrument design, and in other ways. In particular, we are very grateful to David G. Bowers, M. Kent Jennings, Jerome Johnston, Lloyd D. Johnston, Michael K. Moch, Patrick M. O'Malley, and David R. Segal.

An effort of this sort also involves the participation of literally hundreds of interviewers and other research staff members. We cannot acknowledge all of their contributions individually, but we do want to express our thanks to the Sampling, Field and Coding Sections of the Survey Research Center, who contributed to the survey of civilians, and to staff members in the Center for Research on the Utilization of Scientific Knowledge and also military staff members who together made possible the data collections from Army and Navy personnel.

The data computations for this report employed the OSIRIS computer software system, which was jointly developed by the component Centers of the Institute for Social Research using funds from the National Science Foundation, the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, and other sources. Much of the actual analysis work was ably carried out by Donna Ando and by Ellen Dixon.

Judy Redmond managed the complex job of manuscript preparation with patience and dedication. Others who helped in typing text and/or tables include Mary Lou Davis, Mary Dempsey, Rebecca Margerum and Ludmilla Litus.

A final word of thanks is reserved for the thousands of soldiers, sailors and civilians who participated in our surveys. We hope we have reflected their several viewpoints faithfully.

Funding for this research was provided by the Office of Naval Research, Organizational Effectiveness Research Programs, under Contract No. N00014-67-A-0181-0048, and by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, under Grant DAHC19-74-G-0017. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent institutional positions of the Department of the Navy or the Department of the Army.

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CHAPTER 1

THE "MILITARY MIND" AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In the years of debate which preceded the return to an all-volunteer staffing of the armed forces, a number of problems or objections were raised. Some questions were concerned with costs, others had to do with whether a sufficient number of volunteers could be obtained, and perhaps the most profound set of issues centered around the societal and political impact of moving to an all-volunteer force. We will discuss below our concern about a distinct "military mind" resulting from a military force made up of career men rather than "citizen soldiers." Such issues and problems have been discussed at length elsewhere (see especially Tax, 1967; President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970) and they have been dealt with also in our other recent research (Bachman and Johnston, 1972; Johnston and Bachman, 1972; Bachman, 1973, 1974; Bowers and Bachman, 1974; Blair, 1975). One of our purposes in the present study is to report levels of public awareness and concern over some of these issues. The main purpose, however, is to show some of the implications for the all-volunteer force if certain assumptions made by the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force are faulty.

Recently Janowitz and Moskos (1974) demonstrated that the assumptions made by the President's Commission

concerning racial composition of the all-volunteer force were greatly in error. The Commission had expected the racial as well as other aspects of the demographic composition of the all-volunteer force to remain quite similar to that of the "mixed force" made up of a mix of conscripts, draft-motivated volunteers, true volunteers, and a career force of reenlistees (President's Commission, 1970). Janowitz and Moskos (1974) presented data on the racial composition of the armed forces that show that a clear racial imbalance (compared to the population as a whole) is developing--contrary to the Commission's expectations.

Our own concern is not with racial imbalance but with the possibility of a "pro-military" ideological imbalance. Such an imbalance could result from increases in the proportion of career-oriented military personnel under all-volunteer conditions. The President's Commission (1970:133) had assumed that the make-up of the all-volunteer force in terms of career-orientation would not differ greatly from that found in the mixed force. For example, it was believed that the turnover rate of first-term enlisted men would be about three-quarters of that found under non-voluntary conditions; i.e., about 65 percent of first-term enlisted men would not reenlist after their first tour of duty in an all-volunteer force. This would result in only a slightly larger proportion of the total force (48% compared to 40%) consisting of reenlistees, which the Commission referred to as the "career force."

Reenlistment data reported by the Department of the Army (1975) indicate that these assumptions by the President's Commission may also have been in error. Reenlistment rates among first-term personnel in the Regular Army (i.e., with draftees excluded) rose from 18 percent in 1970 to 40 percent as of mid-1975. Among later term personnel the rise during that period was from 63 percent to 75 percent. For the total Regular Army (first term and later term combined) the reenlistment rate rose from 31 percent in 1970 to 54 percent by mid-1975. Since reenlistment rates clearly affect the overall proportion of reenlistees versus first-termers, we conclude that the President's Commission may have greatly underestimated the relative size of the "career force" which might develop under all-volunteer conditions.

In this chapter we argue that as the proportion of career-oriented personnel in the all-volunteer force increases, that force will be less likely to match civilian values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military. To put it another way, our findings suggest that an enlarged proportion of careerists will increase the danger of what has been called a "separate military ethos" or the "military mind." Before presenting the data in support of that argument, it will be useful to provide an overview of the study as a whole. We begin by describing the sources of our data. Then we summarize civilian and military perspectives on the military in the United States. Finally, after presenting our argument that

increased proportions of careerists represent a problem in the all-volunteer force, we offer some recommendations for dealing with that problem.

Data Sources

The research underlying this report began under the sponsorship of the U.S. Office of Naval Research. That effort, summarized by Bowers and Bachman (1974), was designed to explore the impact upon the Navy of changes in values, views and preferences that are occurring in American society at large. One of the major emphases was upon issues of recruitment under all-volunteer conditions. The research strategy involved a comparison of Navy personnel with a cross-section of civilians, sampled in late 1972 and early 1973, using virtually identical survey instruments. A more recent extension of this research effort, sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Institute, provided comparable data from Army personnel sampled in late 1974 and early 1975. Thus we are able to represent soldiers, sailors and civilians, all responding to the same questions about the U.S. military and its mission.

Samples

Our findings are based on survey data collected from three samples: (1) a representative national cross-section of the civilian population surveyed in early 1973; (2) a sample of Navy personnel in late 1972 and early 1973, stratified so as to be repre-

sentative of major Navy entities (ships and shore stations); and (3) a sample of Army personnel in late 1974 and early 1975, stratified to represent major Army entities. Sixteen-page, self-completed questionnaires, identical except for certain personal background measures, were administered to respondents in all three samples. The samples are described in greater detail in Appendix A. (The numbers of women in the Army and Navy samples were very small and somewhat unevenly distributed throughout the analysis groupings of interest to us. Accordingly, analyses of Army and Navy data in the present report have been limited to male respondents.)

Measures

The questionnaires administered to all three samples included a series of items dealing with values, preferences, and perceptions about the military. The questions were designed in such a way that they could be answered by both civilians and servicemen. It seems likely, of course, that the Army and Navy respondents answered some of these items with particular reference to their own experience in the service, whereas many civilians answered with a more general frame of reference. Nevertheless, we think that the questions are in many respects quite comparable for both service personnel and civilians.

Earlier work included a number of analyses conducted separately for five groups: Navy officers, first-term Navy enlisted men, later-term Navy enlisted men, civilian men, and civilian women. The

patterns of correlations observed for each of these groups were basically quite similar, thus suggesting that the items and indexes have common meanings for various military and civilian subgroups (Bachman, 1974).

The basic measures we will be using throughout this study are presented in Table 1.1. As a matter of convenience, the measures are organized in this study according to the conceptual categories followed in prior work with these data (Bachman, 1973, 1974). A more detailed description of the development of the measures may be found in Appendix B. We have also included there a detailed discussion of the prior factor analyses that were performed and their interpretation (Bachman, 1974). All of the questionnaire items and rules for index construction are presented in Appendix C. The reader is urged to refer to these sources for a clearer understanding of what the measures contain and how they should be interpreted.

Overview of Findings in Later Chapters

Civilian Views of the Military

Chapter 2 summarizes civilian views about the military, as reflected in the questionnaire data collected from the national sample of civilians in early 1973. In that chapter several different themes are stressed.

One theme is that public views of the military in 1973 were indeed a mixture of positive and negative feelings, depending upon the dimension being considered.

TABLE 1.1

Summary of Military Value, Preference and Perception Measures

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE

- Perceived Military Job Opportunities
- Perceived Fair Treatment in Services
- Perceived Discrimination Against Women and Blacks

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

- Perceived Competence of Military Leaders

MILITARY INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY

- *Preference for Higher Military Spending
- *Role of Military in Society Perceived as Negative
- Perceived Military (Versus Civilian) Influence
- Preferred Military (Versus Civilian) Influence
- Adequacy of Military Influence (Perceived Minus Preferred)

FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER

- Support for Military Intervention
- Preference for U.S. Military Supremacy
- Vietnam Dissent

ISSUES INVOLVED IN AN ALL- VOLUNTEER FORCE

- Support for Amnesty
- *Opposition to Unquestioning Military Obedience
- *Opposition to Obedience in My Lai-type Incident
- Preference for "Citizen Soldiers" (Versus "Career Men")
- Preference for Wide Range of Political Views Among Servicemen

NOTES: Measures marked with an asterisk (*) are single items. All others are indexes based on two or more items. A complete listing of items included in each measure appears in Appendix B.

The evaluation of the military organization was generally favorable; yet there was considerable reluctance to support the use of military force except in self-defense. In the area of civil-military relations, we found mostly positive ratings of the role of the military in society and the level of military versus civilian influence; nevertheless, a majority of respondents were critical of waste, inefficiency, and excess spending in the military.

We noted also a fairly strong pattern of intercorrelations among the different dimensions along which people rated the military and its mission. These intercorrelations were reflected in a general factor of pro-military (or anti-military) sentiment: those who were most favorable toward the military along one dimension tended to be among the more favorable -- or less critical -- along other dimensions. For example, those individuals who rated military leadership as highly competent also expressed lower than average criticism of military budgets.

Evaluations of the military and its mission varied somewhat across different groups. Younger (≤ 34) college graduates as a group not only called the use of military force into question, but also were critical of virtually all aspects of the military organization and existing civil-military relations as well. On the other hand, older (> 35) non-college graduates as a group showed predominantly pro-military attitudes, but were still critical of the use of military force for intervention, high levels of military spending, and the fairness of

treatment within the military. (The other two groups examined -- older college graduates and younger non-graduates -- exhibited intermediate levels of pro- or anti-military attitudes.)

In the analyses reviewed above, and presented in detail in Chapter 2, we did not deal directly with public views about the All-Volunteer Force. We will review our findings in this area very briefly here (for further information, see Bachman, 1973).

The results from the questionnaire, and also from a special interview segment administered only to civilians, indicated strong majority support for the concept of the all-volunteer force and relatively little concern about some of the issues which have been raised as potential problems. The nationwide civilian sample supported the all-volunteer approach rather than the draft by nearly a two-to-one margin. There was also very strong support for the higher military pay levels considered to be necessary under a volunteer system.

When asked about issues related to the types of people who would staff the military services, there was a slight tendency for people to favor "citizen-soldiers" over "career men," but the views seemed rather mixed. Civilian responses to open-ended interview items about the all-volunteer force left a dominant impression that the general public has not thought much about the question of what kinds of people will, or should, staff an all-volunteer armed force.

The make-up of an all-volunteer force has been of considerable concern to us, however. The findings we will present here represent an attempt to come to grips with an important question: to what extent are the attitudes found among military men representative of civilian values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military--and is the answer different for career military men versus non-career men?

Military Men View the Military

Our examination of belief systems concerning the military found among military men has been based on the sample of Navy personnel surveyed in late 1972 and early 1973 and the sample of Army personnel surveyed in late 1974 and early 1975. The findings are detailed in Chapter 3; a few of the highlights are noted here.

First of all, we failed to find a clear and uniform pro-military stance among the military men as a whole. There were substantial differences among our military respondents -- they were not all of a single "military mind."

Second, it appears that the most important factor in accounting for variations in military views is career-orientation. Those who had career interests in the military were, on the average, enthusiastically pro-military along virtually every dimension shown in Table 1.1. Non-career men, on the other hand, were quite different from their career counterparts in most respects; their ratings of the military were much more mixed.

Third, we found that the Army data collected in 1974-75 replicated the 1972-73 Navy data in most respects. The findings for enlisted men were highly similar (as shown in Figure 3.2); in both branches the career-oriented enlisted men were strongly pro-military, whereas the non-career enlisted men were not. (In fact, the non-career enlisted men were quite critical of the military in terms of leadership competence and fair treatment.) Among the officers, career-oriented men in both the Army and the Navy were quite pro-military, while non-career officers in the Navy were distinctly less favorable. The non-career Army officers, however, were almost as pro-military as career officers--thus failing to replicate the Navy findings. (See Figure 3.3 for the data on officers.) In Chapter 3 we offer some speculations about possible reasons for the difference between the Army and Navy non-career officer groups.

Soldiers, Sailors and Civilians: A Comparison

Chapter 4 compares career and non-career officers and enlisted men with civilians--more specifically, with subgroups of the civilian sample that match each military group fairly closely in terms of age and education. Since military groups differ in age and education, and since both of these dimensions were related to civilian views about the military, the matched group analyses were seen as a way to separate uniquely "military" aspects of ideology from those having to do with age and education. The results, presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, are fully consistent with the findings summarized above.

The non-career military men were in many respects not very different from their civilian counterparts. Non-career enlisted men were quite similar, on the average, to civilians age 19 through 24 in their views about foreign policy, military power, Vietnam, amnesty, "citizen soldiers," and their overall rating of the military in society. In other areas, however, there were some differences. The non-career enlisted men were more critical than their civilian counterparts in ratings of military working conditions and the competence of officers; but they were more pro-military than the young civilians in their preferences for military spending and higher military (versus civilian) influence over decisions involving national military policy. Non-career Navy officers were also fairly similar to their civilian counterparts (in this case college graduates age 34 or younger); on the other hand, non-career officers in the Army were consistently more pro-military than the civilians.

Military men with career interests were much more pro-military than their civilian counterparts. The findings are especially strong in the case of career officers. Because the great majority of officers are college graduates, we contrasted them with civilian college graduates. Since, within the civilian sample, college graduates are generally <u>less</u> favorable to the military, the contrast with career officers is particularly striking. Compared with their educational peers in civilian life, the career officers are a great deal more favorable toward the military organization, more eager for U.S. military supremacy (rather than parity with the Soviet Union), more willing to make use of military power, and much more in favor

of enlarged military (versus civilian) influence over U.S. policy affecting the military.

Military Versus Civilian Influence

At several points in this overview of findings we referred to the issue of military versus civilian influence. The question of who should have more influence in major decisions involving the military and national security--civilian leaders or military leaders--is discussed in Chapter 5. One section of the questionnaire filled out by the soldiers, sailors and civilians in our study asked for ratings of military versus civilian influence in each of five areas, ranging from decisions about battlefield tactics to U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts and whether to use nuclear weapons. For each of the five areas, respondents indicated both their perceptions ("how I think it is now") and their preferences ("how I'd like it to be").

Civilian responses to these questions showed, in the aggregate, a good deal of satisfaction with what they perceived to be the balance of military versus civilian influence (see Figure 5.1). It is not surprising to find that civilians rated military leaders as more influential than civilians in determining battlefield tactics, nor is it surprising that they preferred things that way. What is surprising is that the average civilian respondent rated military and civilian leaders as being about equally influential in such traditionally (and legally) "civilian control" areas as involving U.S.

servicemen in foreign conflicts or deciding whether to use nuclear weapons; still more surprising is the finding that the civilian respondents liked it that way.

If civilians, on the average, were satisfied with the status quo as they perceived it, military men surely were not. This is one area in which both career and non-career Army and Navy men preferred to see change. Having said that, we must immediately add that there were substantial and rather interesting differences between career and non-career men, and between officers and enlisted men, in their responses to these questions (these differences are spelled out in Chapter 5, see Figure 5.3). Nevertheless, all of the military groups preferred at least somewhat more military (versus civilian) influence than they perceived presently to exist.

The career military men in particular, to a far greater degree than non-career men, preferred an across-the-board increase in military influence. Both career officers and career enlisted men rated military leaders as being less influential than civilians in all areas except battlefield tactics (where they were rated equal); and both groups thought the level of military influence should be substantially increased. The findings (shown in Figure 5.3) are much stronger than are usually found on survey scales of this sort (and much stronger than the findings for civilians or non-career military men). If they are to be taken at all seriously, they indicate a profound sense of dissatisfaction among career military men--a feeling

that their own kind, the top military leaders, should have a good deal more power over most national military policy than civilian leaders do.

Why Career Military Men Are Different: Attitude Change or Self-Selection

We have noted that career military men are, on the average, ideologically different from their civilian counterparts and also from non-career military men. It is important to consider why this pattern of differences in attitudes occurs. In Chapter 3 we distinguish two possible explanations--each of which may be true, to some degree:

1. During the early years of military experience, those individuals who will later reenlist undergo attitude change in a more pro-military direction--a process of "socialization into the military."

2. Prior to enlistment, some individuals are more pro-military than others, and these differences are influential in the self-selection process reflected in the decision to reenlist.

Our data did not permit a thoroughgoing test of these two alternative explanations; however, we were able to shed some light on the matter. The analyses in Chapter 3 suggest that the dominant role is played by self-selection--individuals on the pro-military side of the ideological spectrum are the ones most likely to pursue careers in the military. If we may anticipate our discussion of policy implications for just a moment, it would seem that if we

are concerned about maintaining some degree of ideological balance in the all-volunteer force, we may need to take special pains to insure that military recruits represent a broad ideological cross-section. In the following section we suggest some ways in which this might be done.

Policy Implications and Recommendations[1]

The research summarized here, based on a comparison of Army, Navy and civilian samples, has shown important ideological differences between career military men and their non-career or civilian counterparts. We think these differences may have implications for the all-volunteer force of the future.

Under present conditions, an all-volunteer force is likely to recruit and retain personnel from only part of the ideological range found in the civilian population. The very individuals who are needed to broaden the ideological balance are probably the least likely to enlist--or reenlist. Present conditions in the services are changing, and such changes may help to obtain a representative cross-section of volunteers. But if the nation's leaders value the concept of the citizen soldier or sailor, they would do well to broaden the incentives in ways that are especially attractive to those presently underrepresented among volunteers. And, in spite of the additional costs involved, it would be wise to seek out some kinds of enlistees who are likely to serve for one term only and then return to civilian life.

What Kinds of Recruits and How to Recruit Them?

Career military men--and those most likely to become career men--tended to be more zealous about the military than their civilian age-mates. This is one of the strongest and most consistent findings in our research. There is much to indicate that these differences were due, at least in part, to processes of selection--the more "pro-military" were likely to re-enlist in the Navy. These findings on reenlistment, which held true for a Navy cross-section in 1972-73, and for an Army cross-section in 1974-75, are more and more likely to apply to first enlistments, now that we are in an all-volunteer system.

How should military recruiting efforts respond to this finding that its enlistees and especially its career men are likely to come from only a limited ideological range? One approach is to embrace this state of affairs enthusiastically, recognizing that the more pro-military individuals are likely to be less troublesome and more in agreement with traditional military values and practices than some of their less "gung ho" contemporaries. Indeed, the idea of concentrating recruitment efforts on those most favorably disposed toward the military is one of the specific recommendations in a recent report to the Army that introduced the concept of the "quality man"--an individual who, among other things, says that he places high importance on patriotism, is proud of being an American, would be among the first to defend the country if it were attacked, and is generally more

favorable toward military service (Opinion Research Corporation, 1974).

The approach of aiming recruitment efforts toward the more gung ho is understandably tempting to recruiters and perhaps to many others in the military. And it may appear to be successful in the short run. But in our view such a recruiting approach would be unwise in the long run. It would tend to reenforce and heighten the tendencies we have already observed for career military men to be less than fully representative of the cross-section of civilian viewpoints. By strengthening support for some unnecessary and perhaps counterproductive military traditions and practices--or at least reducing resistance to them--this approach could gradually widen the gap between the military and the civilian world. We suspect that this gap would eventually reduce the supply of recruits below an acceptable level. Such a gap would also increase the risk of developing a "separate military ethos."

An alternative approach, and the one we recommend, is to develop recruitment efforts designed to obtain a broader and more fully representative cross-section of individuals among first-termers and also among career personnel in the military. The primary advantages of such an approach is that it tends to avoid the problems and pitfalls mentioned above. An additional advantage is that extending recruiting efforts beyond the more gung ho may help to attract some of our brightest and most ambitious young people to a period of military service. (Our findings in this study are that pro-military attitudes are somewhat

negatively related to education, and findings in other studies of young people suggest that those who go to college are more likely to express critical views of the military in its present form. Thus an effort to increase recruiting among those who are presently skeptical about military service is likely to involve some of the most able of our young adults.)

How could the military services go about implementing this approach of seeking a broader and more representative cross-section in its recruits? Two types of strategy may be distinguished, and we recommend both. First, the extrinsic incentives to enlistment--those rewards or inducements which are not directly linked to actual performance in the work role--should be geared toward a broader cross-section of individuals, especially those who have relatively high educational abilities and interests. We will say more about this approach in a moment. The second strategy is to modify intrinsic characteristics of military work roles so as to make them more broadly attractive. Elsewhere Bowers and Bachman (1974) have offered a number of specific recommendations for improving military work roles and effectiveness.

Probably the most obvious extrinsic incentive that comes to mind when considering any work role--military or civilian--is pay. The higher the level of pay, the more attractive the work role is assumed to be. In discussions about the feasibility of converting to an all-volunteer force, primary attention was directed to increasing military salaries, and efforts were made to estimate exactly how much money would be required to

induce enough men to enlist under volunteer conditions (President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970). The recent pay increases were surely a necessary condition to establishment of an all-volunteer military force, but in our view the higher salaries do not constitute sufficient conditions--and in some respects the emphasis on pay increases may have led us to overlook other important incentives to military service.

Educational Incentives to Enlistment

One set of incentives which are worth greater attention and emphasis are the educational benefits available to servicemen during and after their tour of duty. Although the young men (and women) bound for college represent a group especially high in ability and ambition, military recruiting policy has to a large degree treated them as unlikely prospects (Binkin and Johnston, 1973). And in its recent report to the Army, the Opinion Research Corporation (1974, p. viii) advised that, "While college students do not express strong opposition any longer to the military as an institution, enlistment still does not appeal to them. Noncollege men remain the Army's major market." But in that same report it is noted that educators rate "interference with education" as a primary deterrent to military service, and feel that this drawback could be offset by greater emphasis on the GI Bill as a source of support for a college education. Some of our own research and writing has also stressed the value of increased emphasis on educational benefits as an important means of maintaining a broader balance

in both ability and ideology among military recruits (Johnston and Bachman, 1972).

In sum, under present conditions the typical high school student planning for college tends to view military service as an unwise interruption of his educational development. Given no change in present conditions--or, worse yet, given any reduction in educational benefits for veterans--it is probably quite accurate to conclude that noncollege men will remain the primary source of military personnel. But we think it would be unwise to leave present conditions as they are. On the contrary, we recommend that the educational benefits in return for military service be retained and enhanced, and that these benefits be publicized more widely. In particular, we would suggest the establishment of specific "pay your way through college plans" that stress the opportunity to qualify for veterans' benefits, amass substantial savings, and accumulate some college credits during a tour of military service following high school.

But why should the military seek out individuals who are likely to serve only one term and then go on to college as civilians? Why should it deliberately recruit those who have such a low liklihood of reenlistment? Some of the advantages in terms of high ability levels and broader perspectives have been noted above, and these help to balance out the costs of higher turnover among those who enter the military in order to work their way through college. But it should be added that a considerable degree of turnover is necessary and desirable in an organization that has

only limited positions of leadership at the top. The "college in exchange for service" formula is a means of attracting able individuals who can learn quickly, serve effectively, and then leave to make room for other fresh recruits. Moreover, high rates of turnover among these individuals would not be a sign of organizational failure, and those who left would not be spending their final years of service frustrated and disillusioned because the military had not lived up to their expectations. We agree with Friedman (1967) that some proportion of "in-and-outers" is desirable in the military services, and we view the use of educational incentives as a particularly effective means for ensuring this sort of turnover.[2]

The "college in exchange for service" approach need not require that military service precede college. On the contrary, there would be substantial advantages for some to complete college first and then enter the service. This would help meet military needs for skilled and educated personnel. Moreover, it seems likely that the broadening and liberalizing effects of higher education, plus the maturity of additional years, would make the college graduates less malleable, more confident and self-reliant, and better able to handle responsibilities than those recruited at an earlier stage of education and maturity.[3]

We view the characteristics listed above as distinct advantages to the military services, but this viewpoint is not universally shared. Some military leaders have stated a preference for the young and impressionable high school graduate rather than the

older, cautious, more questioning college graduate. This brings us back to the fundamental question: who ought to staff the military services? If our aim is to recruit individuals guided by the "My country, right or wrong" principle, then perhaps it would be just as well to avoid a greater emphasis on educational incentives. On the other hand, if we want at least some of our men and women in uniform to raise questions, disagree on occasion, and perhaps even refuse to follow orders that they hold to be contrary to conscience or international law, then educational incentives--particularly those involving college prior to military service--may be of great value.

It is gratifying that the idea of increased use of educational incentives, which was supported by our earlier work (Johnston and Bachman, 1972) and reinforced by the findings presented here, has also been put forward by Janowitz and Moskos (1974) as one of the approaches for reducing racial (and social class) imbalance in the military. It is fortunate indeed that educational incentives can potentially deal with these problems of race and class while at the same time helping to insure--voluntarily--a mix of "in-and-outers" along with career personnel that is closer to a citizen force, not an ideologically isolated career force.

Footnotes

[1]This section has been adapted largely from Bowers and Bachman (1974) pp. 123-129, and from Johnston and Bachman (1972) pp. 197-198.

[2]Of course, not all those who entered the military with the idea of working their way through college are likely to be permanently lost after their first tour of duty. Some who might otherwise never have been exposed to the military will find that it offers career possibilities that fit in well with their interests and abilities. Needless to say, the capacity to retain such individuals on the basis of their first-hand exposure depends in large measure upon the intrinsic characteristics of work roles in the military.

[3]We have discussed elsewhere a possible approach for offering G.I. Bill benefits in advance, coupled with loans, as a means of paying for college in advance of military service (Johnston and Bachman, 1972); and Janowitz and Moskos (1974) have also suggested mechanisms for accomplishing this.

CHAPTER 2

CIVILIAN VIEWS OF THE MILITARY[1]

Vietnam and the Military

Public attention was increasingly focused on the U.S. Military during the course of the Vietnam War. Many negative aspects of the military and its personnel were highlighted. These included financial scandals among senior enlisted men, blatant mistreatment of recruits, the specter of widespread drug use, and the nightmare of My Lai-type atrocities of unknown dimensions. These revelations and the failure to achieve military supremacy despite massive expenditures of resources (both men and material), the increased outrage over the war and the draft expressed on campuses and in mass rallies and marches, and the growing disaffection with the war evidenced in the polls, led some scholars to believe the military had encountered at least a "problem of legitimacy" (and perhaps even a "crisis of legitimacy") in which it had lost its support among the public. (Van Doorn, 1974). In other words, it was felt that the disaffection with the war and what it revealed about the military had generalized into disaffection with the military.

It is time to reassess this assumption about what has happened to the public view and assessment of the military. Howard Schuman (1972), in an insightful analysis of the "Two Sources of Antiwar Sentiment in America," demonstrated empirically that the growing dissent concerning the Vietnam War might be only tangentially related to the sorts of arguments being advanced in the "antiwar movement"--especially as

expressed on university campuses. He distinguished "moral" opposition to the war from "pragmatic" dissent based on the frustrating expenditure of vast resources coupled with only very meager results to be found in that particular war. Therefore, growing disaffection with Vietnam did not for most people mean increasing moral rejection of the war but probably reflected growing pragmatic opposition to a costly disappointment. Hence, the generalization of antiwar sentiment to antimilitary sentiment found on campuses, and reflected in the destruction of ROTC facilities and/or the removal of ROTC from full academic participation, might well not be reflected in mass public attitudes toward the military where antiwar sentiment was based primarily on pragmatic considerations rather than moral ones.

In fact, a number of studies at the Institute for Social Research (which asked respondents to rate various groups on a "feeling thermometer" ranging from 0^{o} to 100^{o}, with 50^{o} as the neutral point) have found that the mean level of feeling toward the military has been warmer, or more positive, than for most other societal groups investigated; moreover, this level has returned to very near 1964 levels by 1974 (Inglehart and Barnes, 1975). A 1973 ISR study had respondents rate a number of institutions on how good a job they were doing for the country as a whole. Some of the findings have been reported by Rodgers and Johnston (1974). The U.S. Military, along with the Nation's colleges and universities, headed the list of fifteen institutions. Sixty percent rated the military as doing a good or very good job, while only ten percent rated it poor or very poor. In the same study, the people running the military were given one of the highest ratings for being "honest and moral." And when asked whether the military should have more influence in society, or less, over half of the respondents said it should be "the same as now," and the rest were split almost exactly between those preferring more military influence and those preferring less. No other institution in the study got such evenly-balanced ratings of influence.

The relatively good ratings of the military in the 1973 ISR study were also found in a recent survey conducted by Harris (1973) for the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations. Forty percent

in that study said they had "a great deal of confidence" in the military. The only institutions rated higher were television news (41 percent), higher educational institutions (44 percent) and medicine (57 percent). Several other branches of the federal government, major companies, organized labor, and even organized religion all received lower confidence ratings than the military. However, the Harris study also indicates that in 1966 almost all the institutions had substantially higher ratings. In the case of the military, the proportion who expressed a great deal of confidence fell from 62 percent in 1966 to 35 percent in 1972, and then rose slightly to 40 percent in 1973.

It has generally been assumed that the public reaction to the Vietnam era affected public views of the military. That has undoubtedly been the case, and our own findings reflect it. However, it also appears that feelings about Vietnam have had an impact on more general trust in government. There is considerable evidence that the secular trend of trust in government has paralleled that of support for the Vietnam War, i.e., both have decreased remarkably throughout the period from 1964 to the early 1970's (Miller, 1974). This is not to say that other factors such as the civil rights movement, urban riots, recessionary periods, inflation, unemployment, and finally Watergate have not been equally or perhaps even more involved in the decline of trust in government. It is, however, to say that pragmatic disaffection with the war might have been directed less toward a military whose hands were dirtied in an immoral war, and more toward the government which was perceived to have been responsible for an un-won war (cf. Modigliani, 1972, for a distinction between attitudes about "interventionism" and those dealing with "administration distrust" found among the public during the Korean War).

Another issue involved in the assumed generalization from revulsion with the horrors of war to antimilitary feelings is the effect of the war on its veterans. The Vietnam Veterans Against the War were eloquent spokesmen for the point of view that antiwar sentiment generalized to antimilitary sentiment, but again one must be careful in extrapolating to other Vietnam era veterans. Two separate longitudinal studies which included young veterans, one directed by Jennings and the other directed by Bachman, do not support such an extrapolation (Jennings and Markus, 1974; Bachman and Jennings, forth-

coming). In fact, in the latter study those who went to Vietnam showed an increase in Vietnam dissent but also a moderate increase in support for more money and influence to be given to the military.

This brief discussion of Vietnam and the military indicates that public views about the military, and about government in general, have been shifting--partly in response to the changing evaluation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Now we turn to an assessment of civilian views of the military at--or near--the end of the Vietnam era (i.e., in early 1973).

A General Factor of Pro-Military Sentiment

In Chapter 1 we referred to a series of correlational and factor analyses performed by Bachman (1974) which are reported in detail in Appendix B to this study. In addition to the relevance of those analyses to the development of the measures we are using, they have considerable substantive meaning for our present analysis of civilian belief systems concerning the military. (In Chapter 4 we will discuss their relevance for civil-military comparisons.)

In Bachman (1974:4) the findings are summarized thus:

> Our examination of intercorrelations among items suggested that there is a general factor of pro-military (or anti-military) sentiment contributing to most of our measures. Factor analyses (summarized in Table B-2) confirmed this view. Those highest in pro-military sentiment rate our military leaders as quite competent, give the services high marks for job opportunity and fair treatment, state a preference for higher levels of military spending and influence, and see the role of the military in society as predominantly positive. Their foreign policy views are rather "hawkish"--they are relatively supportive of U.S. military intervention in other countries, they prefer a position of military supremacy (rather than parity with the U.S.S.R.), they are most likely to support past U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and they are strongly opposed to amnesty for those who refused to serve in Vietnam. Finally, they place a high value on obedience to military authority--they tend to agree with the statement that "servicemen should obey orders without question."

Bachman's discussion of the measure of Vietnam dissent (reproduced here in Appendix B) indicated that its loading on the general factor of pro-military sentiment was particularly strong. Thus, returning to the basic question of the nature of civilian views of the military, we conclude that Vietnam sentiment is, in fact, closely

related to the overall view of "the military." More generally, we have found that most of our items distribute respondents along a pro-military/anti-military continuum, i.e., individuals are similarily ordered from one item to another. But does this consistent set of relationships among an individual's attitudes mean that the anti-Vietnam War sentiment reported in the polls has "generalized" to other aspects of the military? It is to an examination of the distributions of the different items that we turn next for an answer to this question.

Civilian Views of the Military

The first portion of this chapter stressed the intercorrelations among our measures of military views--a pattern indicating that individuals who were most favorable toward the military along one dimension tended to be relatively favorable along other dimensions. But this does not mean that for a typical individual--or for the public in general--views about the military were consistently positive or consistently negative. To the contrary, there were substantial differences in overall ratings of the several aspects of the military we explored; along some dimensions the dominant public view was quite favorable, while along others it was not.

In this section of the chapter we will look first at mean scores on the various measures for all civilians in our sample--the public as a whole. Then we will turn to some variation in the responses to the measures resulting from differences in age, education, and other background characteristics. Finally, we will illustrate the variation in in the values, perceptions, and preferences of civilians by their age and education.

Civilians as a Whole

In Figure 2.1 we have summarized the basic findings for the total civilian sample. The mean score on each measure is reported in terms of its relationship to the substantive midpoint.[2] This relationship

FIGURE 2.1

Mean Scores of All Civilians Contrasted With Midpoint of Each Measure



Center line shows midpoint of each measure; other lines show 1/2 s.d. for all civilians on each measure.

is determined both by the differences of the sample mean from the midpoint and by the standard deviation of the total civilian sample on that item. Hence if a mean score were +.25 scale points different from the midpoint and the standard deviation were .50, then on the figure, the bar would extend to the first line (1/2 S.D.) on the "pro-military" side. The end of the bar represents the location of the mean score with respect to the substantive midpoint or division between pro-military and anti-military responses expressed as proportions of the standard deviation for the sample as a whole.[3] This rather complex procedure was used because the measures differ considerably in terms of the lengths of the scales used as well as the variance from one scale to another, and we wanted to increase the comparability across scales.

The findings reported in Figure 2.1 provide a somewhat different picture of civilian images of the military than we have presented until now. We find that although the items are highly interrelated and display a common underlying factor, their distributions do not demonstrate that in early 1973 the public was either primarily pro- or anti-military. The public as a whole evaluated different aspects of the military quite differently, even though each measure may order individuals similarily.

Our analysis leads us to believe that there are three fundamentally different aspects of the military that are evaluated by the public and reflected by these findings. The first of these deals with the military organization itself. The scales labeled "the military work role" and "military leadership," and the item dealing with "unquestioning military obedience" all deal with dimensions of the military as an organization: how competently it is managed, what it provides, how its members are treated, and what can be expected of them.[4] Generally this aspect of the military was positively evaluated--the military was seen as having competent and trustworthy leaders, as providing considerable job opportunity, as being relatively low in discrimination against women and blacks, and as legitimate in demanding unquestioning obedience. On the other hand, its members were not seen has having much recourse if unfairly treated--especially

in comparison to that enjoyed by civilians.

The second fundamental aspect of the military deals with the use of military force. The measures found under the label "foreign policy and military power" as well as the one asking about "obedience in a My Lai-type incident" reflect attitudes about the appropriate conditions for going to war, the necessity of maintaining military superiority, and the outcome of the Vietnam War. The findings suggest that the mass public is reluctant to go to war except to protect the United States from actual attack, but that it will support efforts to deter such an attack through a high level of military superiority.

Our measure of Vietnam dissent did not show in early 1973 the overwhelming rejection of the War generally reported in poll findings. We feel that this is a reflection of our not just asking respondents the common question of whether the war was a mistake, but asking instead a series of questions that contain both "moral" and "pragmatic" considerations and that combine issues of intervention and national-defense. Unfortunately these measures were developed long before Schuman's (1972) seminal work appeared, and the moral and pragmatic aspects of sentiment toward the war were not clearly delineated in our questions. The end result of the combination of the various items is to provide a measure that indicates ambiguity in the public view of the Vietnam War. A detailed analysis of the findings for the separate items is presented in Bachman (1973).

The third fundamental aspect of the military concerns civil-military relations. The measures we see as reflecting values, perceptions, and preferences in this area are found under the heading "military influence over national policy" and the three items not yet examined under "issues involved in all volunteer force." Civil-military relations involves an interchange between the civilian and military sectors of society or, expressed somewhat differently, between society as a whole and the military organization.

How was the military's relationship to society evaluated? Our data reveal that the role of the military in society was seen as quite positive. In addition, although the military was seen as having considerable influence vis-a-vis civilians in areas dealing with nation-

al security and internal organizational concerns, the public preferred it that way, and hence, the influence of the military was seen as generally adequate--neither excessive nor inadequate.

Before continuing, let us note that these findings come from data collected about six months earlier than those that provided the basic findings reported in the Washington Post by Chapman (1974) and later by Rodgers and Johnston (1974). The summary of the data provided by the Washington Post's headline ("Military Most Admired U.S. Institution") certainly overstates the case, but our findings support the the basic thrust of Rodgers and Johnston's findings which are that the military organization and the role it plays in society are still positively evaluated by the "average person." Although our data can not speak directly to the question, the consistently high levels the military received on the thermometer scores (reported above) throughout the entire Vietnam Era lead us to believe that the findings coming from these two studies are not a reflection of a change in the public image of the military after the war, but indicate a continuing high level of support for the military organization.

The other side of the coin in civil-military relations is what society does for the military. Here the picture is somewhat mixed in terms of public attitudes. There was a considerable reluctance to provide more money to the military.[5] In addition, there seemed to be some reluctance about having only career soldiers or limited political views within the military. These last two items, as noted in Appendix B, are important issues in an all-volunteer force but do not seem to be highly tied to other ideas about the military nor to reflect very well defined attitudes on the part of most people.

The last item dealing with civil-military relations is the index dealing with amnesty or punishment for those who deliberately did not serve in the military. This has been a real "gut" issue during the war and may well reflect many concerns. Here we would like to interpret it in terms of the relationship between the military and the larger society. The rejection of amnesty in the findings seems to us to indicate the basic legitimacy of military service even in an agonizing and divisive war.

In summary, three points need to be emphasized:

1. The distributions of the responses to the various measures we have used reveal that, although similar ordering of individuals may exist across the measures, there remained considerable differences in the values, perceptions, and preferences of the public as a whole concerning different aspects of "the military."

2. At this aggregate level, civilians did not appear entirely or even primarily pro- or anti-military. There was a generally favorable evaluation of the performance of the military organization and its relationship to society, but a dissatisfaction with the present high levels of financial support to the military and a reluctance to support the use of military force except in self defense.

3. The differences in attitudes concerning the military organization and those concerning the use of the force made possible by that organization lead to a clarification of apparently discrepant prior research findings. Some of these studies indicated that the public rejected Vietnam policy and acts of atrocities, but others showed that the public positively evaluated military leaders and the job done by the military for the country.

Sources of Variation

Thus far we have looked at the distribution of respondents' values, perceptions and preferences only at the aggregate level. During the Vietnam era Americans became sensitized to the "counter culture" expressed among youth, and to the quite different attitudes displayed by "hard hats." These reactions to the Vietnam War and to "the military" suggest that aggregate findings do not reflect adequately some very important differences in the public view of the military. There are several possible bases of cleavage within the civilian population that may be important in examining these issues.

The conflict between college protesters and hard hats suggests that the fundamental sources of variation among civilians are based on generational and socio-economic factors. We cannot fully examine generational differences given the cross-sectional nature of the data sets, but we will look at the respondent's age as, at least, a crude indicator of the generational factor. Socio-economic factors include both the respondent's own characteristics as well as those of the parents (see Blau and Duncan, 1967). Hence, we will look not only at the respondent's own education, but also at the level of parental education and at the type of community and region of the respondent's origin.

Two other possible sources of variation in beliefs concerning the military should be considered. An extensive literature has developed on veterans. Generally, the studies do not show large or consistent differences in attitudes between veterans and non-veterans when large scale surveys with representative national samples--which exclude institutionalized or deceased veterans by definition--are used (Jennings and Markus, 1974; Bachman and Jennings, forthcoming; Segal and Segal, 1974). In Bachman (1974) and in Blair and Bachman (1975) this question was examined in detail for the veterans in our civilian sample. The results will be summarized below.

A second possible source of differences is the sex of the respondent. This could reflect not only differences in socialization but also different participation in military service or contact with military personnel.

As a first step in seeking the sources of variation in beliefs concerning the military, we examined the zero-order relationships between each background variable discussed above and each of the seventeen measures from Table 1.1. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.1.

An examination of Table 2.1 reveals that the best predictors, generally, are age and education. However, region of origin and race are also quite powerful predictors for some of the criterion variables. In some cases, parental education and type of community of origin also have some predictive power. As Table 2.1 shows, however, the respondent's

TABLE 2.1

Correlation Ratios [Eta $_{(adj)}$] of Civilian Scores with Background Predictors

	Predictors						
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Age	Educ	Region	Commun	Parent Ed	Race	Sex
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	.086	.188	.097	.046	.117	.067	.028
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	.088	.225	.108	.087	.099	.064	0.0
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	.067	.122	.051	.081	.090	.206	0.0
MILITARY LEADERSHIP							
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	.178	.166	.088	.070	.149	.099	.046
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY							
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	.081	.204	.138	.100	.129	.051	.027
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	.150	.115	.082	.070	.110	.058	0.0
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	.160	0.0	.063	0.0	.057	0.0	.038
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	.093	.194	.132	.127	.097	0.0	0.0
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	.191	.100	.090	.097	.105	0.0	0.0
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER							
Support for Military Intervention	.162	.032	.104	.006	.077	.068	.082
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	.172	.210	.153	.103	.205	.046	.050
Vietnam Dissent	.119	.158	.084	.089	.094	.080	.026
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE							
Support for Amnesty	.283	.124	.047	.104	.148	.206	.080
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	.297	.186	.066	.067	.144	.014	.078
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	.095	.147	.042	.092	.108	.037	.068
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	.107	.077	.069	.078	.050	.076	.086
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	.098	.155	.055	.083	.099	.042	0.0

sex was the least useful predictor and it will be eliminated from further analyses.

Many of these predictor variables are themselves interrelated. For example, blacks are less educated; respondents originating in the South are both less educated and their communities of origin are more rural. Parental education is, of course, related to the respondent's education. Hence, the next step in our analysis was to examine the relative predictive power of the six best predictors, i.e. age, education, region of origin, race, community of origin and parental education. We used Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA)--a multivariate technique which allows for the non-interval properties of some of some of the predictors and, thus, for non-linear relationships as well (See Andrews et al, 1973).

In Table 2.2 we have presented the results of the series of MCA analyses on the 17 measures we have been concerned with. In the table three kinds of information are presented. The first is the rank ordering of the six independent or predictor variables for each dependent or criterion variable in terms of their respective explanatory or predictive power while controlling for the other five variables. The second is the "beta score" for each predictor variable which gives a general estimate of the magnitude of its "net" explanatory power. The reader should not assume that this coefficient is directly comparable to a standardized regression coefficient or "beta weight." It does not accurately reflect the absolute net explanatory power of the predictor, but does give both a reliable ordering of the variables and an estimate of the relative magnitude of each predictor's explanatory power when controlling for the other predictors in the particular analysis.

Finally, for each analysis, the overall explanatory power using all six variables is estimated by the squared multiple correlation coefficient (adjusted for degrees of freedom) or $R^2_{(adj)}$. This coefficient may be interpreted as the proportion of variance explained in the criterion variable by the six predictor variables together. For a more detailed discussion of the uses and potential abuses of MCA see Andrews et al, (1973).

TABLE 2.2

Rank Ordering of Predictors and Beta Scores from MCA

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE (Mean Rank)	Age	Educ	Region	Commun	Parent Ed	Race	R^2(adj)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	(3) .060	(1) .156	(2) .103	(4) .060	(5) .057	(6) .045	.050
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	(5) .040	(1) .197	(2) .083	(3) .073	(6) .017	(4) .046	.043
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	(5) .072	(2) .121	(4) .077	(6) .057	(3) .093	(1) .225	.072
MILITARY LEADERSHIP							
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	(1) .152	(2) .136	(4) .093	(6) .046	(5) .085	(3) .130	.071
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY							
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	(6) .060	(1) .182	(2) .148	(5) .072	(4) .104	(3) .114	.073
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	(1) .141	(2) .115	(3) .098	(6) .078	(4) .082	(5) .078	.049
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	(1) .175	(4) .035	(2) .082	(6) .026	(3) .066	(5) .030	.027
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	(3) .094	(1) .169	(2) .116	(4) .085	(5) .042	(6) .035	.056
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	(1) .197	(3) .093	(2) .096	(5) .053	(4) .062	(6) .038	.053
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER							
Support for Military Intervention	(1) .164	(6) .044	(2) .121	(5) .048	(4) .070	(3) .090	.044
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	(2) .149	(1) .162	(3) .138	(6) .017	(4) .118	(5) .059	.094
Vietnam Dissent	(3) .105	(1) .143	(4) .088	(6) .047	(5) .057	(2) .121	.049
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE							
Support for Amnesty	(1) .268	(3) .121	(5) .053	(6) .045	(4) .083	(2) .213	.138
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	(1) .287	(2) .154	(4) .069	(6) .014	(3) .083	(5) .052	.112
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	(2) .095	(1) .134	(5) .037	(3) .066	(4) .056	(6) .014	.029
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	(1) .135	(3) .097	(2) .100	(5) .067	(6) .054	(4) .077	.030
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	(2) .086	(1) .153	(4) .057	(3) .086	(6) .036	(5) .042	.032

The ability of these background predictors to explain the variance in the perceptions, preferences, and values concerning the military found among civilians is not overwhelming and shows considerable fluctuation from one measure to another. Table 2.2 reveals that from 3% to 14% of the variance is "explained" by the predictors in question (corresponding to multiple correlations from about .17 to .37). The criterion variables best explained by the set of predictors are, in descending order, support for anmesty, opposition to unquestioning military obedience, preference for U.S. military supremacy, preference for higher military spending, perceived discrimination against women and blacks, and perceived competence of military leaders.

Age and education appear to be the best overall predictors but race and region of origin are particularly relevant for understanding some of the beliefs measured. In particular, race is the most powerful predictor of perceptions of discrimination in the military, and is also important in understanding views on amnesty, the Vietnam War, the perceived competence of military leaders, and preferences for military spending.

In addition, the respondent's region of origin tells us something about perceptions of military job opportunities, preferences about the level of military spending, preferences about military (versus civilian) influence, support for military intervention and preferences about U.S. military supremacy. The exact nature of the relationships of each of these four variables to the beliefs we are concerned with are presented below.

An Examination of Age and Education Groups

In Tables 2.3 and 2.4 we have presented the mean scores for the six age groups and four educational groups respectively. The relationship of age to the measures under consideration is not neatly linear. Youth 16-18 generally presented a more positive view of the military than did those who are 19-24. This latter group was the most negative of all. This same general negative pattern was also true, but to a

TABLE 2.3

Mean Scores for Civilian Age Groups

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE (N):	16-18 (109)	19-24 (249)	25-34 (403)	35-44 (272)	45-60 (425)	≧61 (301)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.54	3.38	3.27	3.36	3.46	3.48
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.62	2.38	2.37	2.52	2.49	2.61
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.54	2.64	2.60	2.37	2.48	2.48
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3.36	3.07	3.28	3.51	3.53	3.55
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY						
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.69	2.48	2.48	2.65	2.68	2.65
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.30	2.53	2.25	2.17	2.26	2.22
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.51	3.52	3.23	2.98	3.10	3.11
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.15	3.06	3.08	3.26	3.27	3.25
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	4.37	4.46	4.15	3.72	3.82	3.87
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	2.33	2.20	2.31	2.49	2.15	2.07
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.69	2.57	2.76	2.96	3.02	2.95
Vietnam Dissent	2.43	2.64	2.52	2.35	2.41	2.38
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support for Amnesty	2.63	2.61	2.08	1.79	1.81	1.86
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.29	2.66	2.42	2.09	1.99	1.77
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.27	2.32	2.21	2.09	2.13	2.09
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.79	2.72	2.64	2.49	2.55	2.48
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.75	2.89	2.86	2.78	2.75	2.61

TABLE 2.4

Mean Scores for Civilian Educational Groups

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE (N):	Less Than 12 Years (574)	12 Years (580)	Some College (316)	College Graduate (243)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.59	3.40	3.22	3.12
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.69	2.52	2.30	2.13
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.49	2.38	2.60	2.79
MILITARY LEADERSHIP				
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3.57	3.43	3.20	3.16
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY				
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.79	2.63	2.48	2.22
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.23	2.22	2.36	2.44
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.24	3.17	3.22	3.13
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.32	3.25	3.08	2.83
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	3.92	3.93	4.15	4.30
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER				
Support for Military Intervention	2.20	2.23	2.32	2.27
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	3.02	2.91	2.75	2.44
Vietnam Dissent	2.35	2.42	2.55	2.70
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE				
Support for Amnesty	2.03	1.89	2.18	2.30
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	1.97	2.17	2.38	2.50
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.06	2.13	2.27	2.38
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.66	2.56	2.58	2.46
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.66	2.78	2.89	3.00

lesser extent, among those 25-34.

The group of adults most positive toward various aspects of the military were those 35-44 in age. They appeared most likely to reflect those views which can be associated with the cold war concerning the military organization, the use of military force, and civil-military relations. For example, in 1973 this group was the one most supportive of military intervention in contrast to those younger and those older, who were both more isolationist. Age, then, is an important source of variation for almost all of the beliefs we are examining. It does not reveal a simple linear relationship but appears to reflect the different experiences and concerns of respondents from different generational cohorts.

Education, as shown in Table 2.4, has a much more straightforward relationship to attitudes concerning the military. Better educated respondents were more anti-military and less educated respondents were more pro-military.

There are some interesting differences in the beliefs concerning the military which appear to have age rather than education as the fundamental source of variation. The age related measures deal with issues of authority (in addition to the interventionist-isolationist issue discussed above). For example, related primarily to age are views about the competence of military leaders, the role of the military in society, the perceived amount of military (versus civilian) influence, the adequacy of that influence, amnesty for draft evaders, unquestioning military obedience, and the personnel composition of the military. On the other hand, education and not age is the primary predictor of beliefs concerning military job opportunities, fair treatment in the military services, military budget matters, preferences about military (versus civilian) influence, U.S. military supremacy, the Vietnam War, obedience in a My Lai-type incident, and the range of political views permitted among servicemen.

In other words, age seems to be most related to perceptions, preferences and values concerning authorities and authoritarian practices with younger civilians more likely to see military authority as all pervasive, incompetent, and coercive. Older civilians saw

primarily the reverse; although, as indicated above, the relationships are not neatly linear.

On the other hand, education seems to be most related to beliefs concerning opportunities or abuses within the military service, the allocation of national resources, whether military force is necessary, and under what circumstances it should be used. These items seem to reflect broader issues of alternatives available to the individual respondent as well as alternative allocations of national resources. Less educated respondents saw military service as more attractive and also supported the military's receiving higher amounts of important resources such as money and influence. Better educated respondents saw such service as less attractive and also favored less allocation of national resources to the military.

Several of our measures seem to reflect this difference between variation by age and variation by education quite well. Age is most important in understanding views on unquestioning military obedience. This measure mostly reflects an issue of the acceptance or rejection of authority. Younger respondents rejected such unquestioning obedience and older respondents supported it. On the other hand, the measure of what soldiers should do in a My Lai-type incident deals more with the moral issues of the appropriate circumstances for the use of military force. Here education is most important; better educated respondents more clearly rejected this use of military force and less educated respondents showed ambivalence at most. Of course in the first case of military obedience, education was highly related as well. Our point here, however, is that in that case the more fundamental cleavage or source of variation was age not education.

Perhaps an even clearer example of this difference is found in the measures dealing with military (versus civilian) influence. Age is the primary predictor of the perception of what influence the military actually has and education the primary predictor of what influence it should have. The first is an issue of the pervasiveness of martial authority in society; the second is an issue of the allocation of important national resources. In other words, age seems to be a major determinant of the perceptions of the "military

industrial complex" given similar evaluations of it. Alternatively, education seems to be a major determinant of the evaluation of that complex given similar perceptions of its existence.

An Examination of Racial and Regional Groups

Our primary expectation in examining the respondent's race was that blacks would not exhibit particularily anti-military views, for the military has been traditionally perceived among blacks to be an avenue of upward social mobility and to have lower levels of racial discrimination than in society generally (Moskos, 1971). Table D2.3 (in Appendix D) shows little in the way of consistent differences by race. The most important one concerns perceived discrimination against women and blacks. Blacks perceived much higher levels of discrimination than whites and than those respondents classified as "other" (including Mexican-Americans and self-designated "other"). It is not clear that even blacks saw the military as more discriminatory than the rest of society since we have no comparable questions for society generally. It is most likely that discrimination is seen as all-pervasive. Perceptions of the military's relative ranking (in the extent of discrimination) cannot be determined directly with these data.[6] Blacks were also somewhat less likely to support high levels of military spending, to oppose the Vietnam War and support amnesty for draft evaders. However, the main point of Table D2.3 should not be missed: there are few consistent racial differences in beliefs about the military--especially when such variables as age, education, and childhood background are controlled.

Regional effects were expected to be considerable, but our data do not reveal generally strong effects. Again, after controlling for other variables, the relationships are modest. However, the South did generally stand out as the most supportive of the military and New England as the least. The more important regional differences as indicated both by the MCA analyses and Table D2.4 (Appendix D) are those where respondents of Southern origin were more likely to perceive job opportunities in the military services, to be more supportive of

military spending, to prefer more military (versus civilian) influence, to support military intervention, and to prefer U.S. military supremacy.

In summary, our work with these data reveals that there are a few substantively important differences in the view of the military as reflected by measures of the respondents' backgrounds such as their region of origin and race and, to a lesser extent, by community of origin, parental education, or sex. However, the primary bases of cleavage within the civilian population in terms of their attitudes about the military are age and education.

An Illustration of Variation by Age and Education

To this point in our analysis we have examined the strength of various relationships and the relative predictive powers of different background variables. Next we will present an illustrative analysis similar to the one we presented for civilians as a whole above. This analysis is designed to prove a more substantively meaningful picture of the distributions of the beliefs under consideration. Also it will be a more graphic presentation of differences according to age and educational groups--the primary sources of variation in civilian beliefs.

For simplicity of presentation and comparison, we have dichotomized age into "younger" and "older" defined as 34 or younger and 35 or older. In addition, we have separated our sample into college graduates and non-college graduates. Our other work above has shown that these two background variables do not have clearly consistent, linear relationships to the attitudinal measures we have been examining here. However, little is lost in our understanding of these relationships by using dichotomies for purposes of illustration here.

The findings for the two extreme groups that result from combining these two dichotomies are shown in Figure 2.2[7]. The same measurement and data manipulation procedures are used as in Figure 2.1. Because the variance from one group to the next on each item is very similar, we have again used the standard deviation of the civilian sample as a whole and the results are reported in proportions of

FIGURE 2.2

Mean Scores of Civilian Groups Contrasted With Midpoint of Each Measure



Center line shows midpoint on each measure; other lines show 1/2 s.d. for all civilians on each measure.

standard deviation units.[8]

We will not here discuss the findings in the same detail as we did for the public as a whole. The two extreme groups should be particularily noted, however, and have, thus, been presented in the figure. Younger college graduates showed a fairly high level of "anti-military" responses. This is consistent with Schuman's (1972) finding that the moral, as opposed to pragmatic, opposition to the Vietnam War he discovered in his sample was found primarily among young college graduates in the mass public. However, even here the major distinction between the military organization and the use of military force applies. The young graduates were consistently more opposed to all forms of using military force than they were to the military organization with the exception of the measure of fairness within the military services. They also evaluated civil-military relations in a very negative light. They wanted considerably reduced military spending, perceived a very influential military whose influence is excessive, and were concerned about all the issues involved in an all-volunteer force.

The opposites of the young college graduates are the older non-graduates. This group showed the most consistently "pro-military" views. But their consistency was less than that of the younger college graduates. They consistently perceived the military organization as a positive entity (except again for fair treatment). When it came to the use of military force, however, they were also reluctant to support any action not related to national defense. In fact their scores on the support for military intervention index equal those of the younger college graduates and probably reflect two very different types of isolationism. In terms of civil-military relations, the older non-graduates saw the military as making an important contribution to society and were less reluctant to provide money and to support greater than present military influence. Nor did they seem greatly concerned about the kinds of issues raised by the all-volunteer force.

The other two groups (not shown in Figure 2.2) fall in intermediate categories in terms of pro-or anti-military attitudinal consistency. Some aspects of the military were more likely to be called into

question by older college graduates, and other aspects were more critically evaluated by the younger non-graduates.

In sum, there were, in early 1973, important variations within civilian values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military. The most important of these were linked to the age and education of the respondents. At the aggregate level, younger college graduates exhibited the greatest consistency of attitudes. This may well reflect the generalization of concerns with the Vietnam War to all things military, although even in this group the military organization fared better than did the use of military force or the state of civil-military relations.

Summary and Conclusions

In this look at the public view of the military, based primarily on questionnaire data collected from national sample of civilians in early 1973, we have stressed several different themes.

First, we noted a fairly strong pattern of intercorrelations among the different dimensions along which people rated the military and its mission. In general, we found that those who were most favorable toward the military along one dimension tended to be among the more favorable -- or less critical -- along other dimensions. For example, those individuals who rated military leadership as highly competent also expressed lower than average criticism of high military budgets.

But the second, and perhaps most important, theme stressed here is that public views of the military were indeed a mixture of positive and negative feelings, depending upon the dimension being considered. The evaluation of the military organization was generally favorable; yet there was considerable reluctance to support the use of military force except in self-defense (even though those individuals most favorable toward the military organization were also more willing to support the use of military force under a wider range of circumstances). In the area of civil-military relations, we found mostly positive ratings of the role of the military in society and the level

of military versus civilian influence; nevertheless, a majority of respondents were critical of waste, inefficiency, and excess spending in the military.

The finding that the military and its mission received "mixed reviews" at the hands of a national cross-section of civilians may help shed light on some apparently discrepant prior research findings. Several studies found that the public rejected Vietnam policy to an increasing degree during the late sixties and early seventies, but other research indicated that the public fairly consistently gave high ratings to military leaders and the job that the military was doing for the country. We have argued that these two kinds of findings are not incompatible, particularly if the government--rather than the military leadership--was blamed for getting the U.S. involved in Vietnam. At the same time it must be acknowledged that those most strongly critical of Vietnam policy also tended to be the least supportive of the military along other dimensions, thus suggesting that for some individuals a frustration with Vietnam policy may have led to a heightened dissatisfaction with the military as a whole.

Our detailed examination of the sources of variation in civilian values, perceptions and preferences concerning the military showed age and education to be the most important predictors of these beliefs, although race and region of origin were also useful predictors in several instances. We interpret age and education to be general indicators of generational differences and socio-economic differences respectively. This interpretation is also consistent with differences in the relative explanatory power of these two predictor variables on different kinds of issues.

Age seemed to be most associated with issues of authority--its pervasiveness and its legitimacy--and thus seems to be the much discussed generational factor. Education was the primary predictor related to issues of opportunities and abuses within the military, to concerns over the appropriate allocation of important national resources such as money and influence, and the appropriate use of military force. These issues seem to reflect the differential sets of personal alternatives available as well as the differential moral

concerns associated with socio-economic factors. Other background factors such as community of origin, parental education, and sex of respondent were essentially unrelated to these beliefs.

When veterans and non-veterans were compared, few differences were found in attitudes about the military (Bachman, 1974; Blair and Bachman, 1975). The veterans were, however, more likely to rate the military as less influential, were more strongly opposed to amnesty, and were more supportive of a "career military" than were non-veterans. Within the group of veterans there were variations in ratings of the military--those who were dissatisfied with their own service experience tended to be less favorable to the miltitary as a whole. However, those who were satisfied with their military service were not more favorable than those civilians who had not served at all. This finding is consistent with a recent study of personal contact with governmental agencies (Katz et al., 1975) which found that only negatively evaluated contact has any effect different than no contact at all.

Evaluations of the military and its mission, then, vary somewhat across different groups. Younger college-graduates as a group not only called the use of military force into question, but were critical of virtually all aspects of the military organization and existing civil-military relations as well. On the other hand, older non-graduates as a group showed predominantly pro-military attitudes, but were still critical of the use of military force for intervention, high levels of military spending, and the fairness of treatment within the military. The other two groups examined--older college graduates and younger non-graduates--exhibited intermediate levels of pro- or anti-military attitudes. The older graduates were more likely to call some aspects of the military into question, and the younger non-graduates to critically evaluate others.

Footnotes

[1]This chapter is based primarily on Blair and Bachman (1975) which we have revised and extended considerably in Blair (1975). The latter version is presented here.

[2]The substantive midpoint is the point on the scale which divides responses into those that are favorable or "pro-military" and those that are unfavorable or "anti-military." The classifications used are consistent with the results of the factor analyses reported.

[3]The actual scores can be found in Tables D2.1 and D2.2 (Appendix D).

[4]The item on unquestioning military obedience has been included here as one measure of attitudes toward the military organization. It was felt that it dealt primarily with what the military organization can legitimately demand of its members and that it measures a basic acceptance or rejection of a major aspect of the military organization.

[5]In this study we have separated the item (C25) dealing with military spending from the index combining preference for higher military spending and influence. This single item is the measure we have used throughout this study. Other findings (Bachman, 1974) report the index described in Appendix C. The two items used in the index are very highly correlated in all groups examined, but in this study we wanted to focus specifically on the issue of military spending.

[6]Our analysis of white and black Navymen supports the general interpretation (for civilians) given here (Bachman, 1973:12).

> Item C8 asks: "To what extent do you think there is any discrimination against black people who are in the armed services?" Here again the mean responses of all groups lie between "a little extent" and "some extent." There are no strong and consistent age-related trends. Looking separately at white and black Navy respondents, we find the median rating by whites is that discrimination against blacks exists in the services "to a little extent," while the median rating by blacks is that anti-black discrimination exists "to a great extent." At first blush, this might suggest that black Navy men find the military services unattractive. But when we compare black and white Navy enlisted men's ratings of just and fair treatment in military service versus civilian life (item C9, discussed earlier), we find that blacks are more favorable toward military service than are whites. The black enlisted men, on the average, rate chances for fair treatment in the military services as being "about the same" as those in civilian life. In other words, while blacks in the Navy perceive a considerable amount of racial discrimination in the military services, they apparently see it as no worse than the level of discrimination they would be exposed to as civilians.

[7]The actual scores for all four groups can be found in Tables D2.5 and D2.6 (Appendix D).

[8]Generally, a difference between the two non-graduate groups of more than .20 standard deviation, between a non-graduate group and a graduate group of more than .25 standard deviation, and between the two graduate groups of more than .30 standard deviation is both substantively and statistically significant. Also, the location of the mean of either non-graduate group more than .10 standard deviation (and more than .20 standard deviation for either college graduate group) from the midpoint means that the distribution is not evenly divided but leans significantly in the pro-or anti-military direction.

CHAPTER 3
MILITARY MEN VIEW THE MILITARY

Homogeneity and Diversity Among Military Men

The belief system of military men, as reflected in most of the military mind literature, has been seen as being quite homogeneous. Abrahamsson (1972) has indicated that there are four homogenization processes among the professional military. They are: self-selection through initial interest or motivation, screening procedures by the military, continuous selection within the profession, and professional socialization and training.

For the purposes of this study, we will assume that all the processes may be at work. The literature leans more heavily in the direction of self-selection (Lovell, 1964) or anticipatory socialization (Lucas, 1971) as the primary mechanism. Socialization effects have been difficult to demonstrate (cf. French and Ernest, 1955; Campbell and McCormack, 1957; Roghmann and Sodeur, 1972). Although socialization effects on the direction of attitudes seem to be modest in his study of West Point cadets, Lovell (1964) does show that there is growing homogeneity in attitudes over time, which supports the arguments presented here. It should also be noted that Abrahamsson (1972) is explicitly dealing with professional military men, and all four processes are more likely to be at work (and over a longer period) than would be indicated in relatively short-term studies of a cross-section of draftees or officer candidates.

This literature, then, reflects a general emphasis on the professional military, not on the military as a whole. There has been a tendency to define the military as consisting of high-level, professional officers (see Mills, 1956; Huntington, 1957, 1963; Janowitz, 1960; Keller, 1963; Monsen and Cannon, 1965; Domhoff, 1967; Russett, 1974). This emphasis on the study of elites has overemphasized the processes of homogenization and ignored the internal cleavages within the uniformed military. We will focus on these cleavages in this chapter.

Hence, for this research, the question of the definition of "Who is military?" among the uniformed forces must be answered. This can best be examined by looking at the nature of internal differentiation within the military; vertical and horizontal. Vertical differentiation is primarily one of rank as a dichotomy forming two separate status groups: officers and enlisted men. This distinction has been an important one historically (Stouffer et al, 1949), and attention has been paid to examinations of each group separately (Janowitz, 1960; Moskos, 1970). Along this vertical dimension, officers are considered more professional and, thus, more "military" than enlisted men. In addition, within each status group, the higher the rank, the more professional--the more the homogenization processes have been at work.

Horizontally, there are major cleavages as well. The most fundamental of these, and of increasing importance during the Vietnam era (Moskos, 1970, 1973b; Helmer, 1974; Cortwright, 1975), is that between career men and non-career men (see also Karsten, 1971; Van Doorn, 1974.)[1] Concern has also been expressed about the belief system consequences of the elimination, or at least reduction, of the non-career group in an all-volunteer force (Janowitz, 1971, 1973; Johnston and Bachman, 1972; Moskos, 1973a; Bachman and Blair, 1975). We have discussed this general problem at length in Chapter 1.

Other possible cleavages are those between services and between branches within the services, with the emphasis being on how traditional the military service or branch is, e.g., the combat arms can be seen as "more military" compared to service support branches.

This research will focus on the primary vertical and horozontal cleavages within the military in examining the nature and extent of homogeneity in the belief systems of military men. Officers will be contrasted with enlisted men; career-oriented men will be compared to those who are not. As a result, the belief systems of four basic groups will be examined: career officers, career enlisted men, non-career officers, and non-career enlisted men.

Our purpose in this chapter is to examine, in considerable detail, the extent and nature of diversity in beliefs among military men. The literature argues for differences based on what we will call "organizational characteristics" of the military respondents: whether they are officers or enlisted men and whether they have career-commitments or not. There are, however, alternative explanations of their differences in beliefs that may be possible. Later in this chapter we will examine them as well.

Our prior analyses of the Navy data (Bachman, 1974; Blair, 1975) confirmed our basic expectations: career-men were consistently different from non-career men; there were also some differences between officers and enlisted men, but these were not as strong nor as consistent as those based on career-orientation. Many of these analyses are presented below in combination with new ones using the sample of Army respondents.

However, prior to examining the Army data we attempted to hypothesize what differences or similarities we expected to find between the Army and the Navy data. With respect to issues of self-selection in an all volunteer context, our expectations were quite straightforward. Without draft-motivation, we hypothesized that processes of ideological self-selection would become more

important and, hence, more favorable beliefs about the military would be required for non-career men to enter voluntarily than had been true for non-career men under pressures of conscription. Hence, we expected the non-career men in the Army sample to be somewhat more "pro-military" than their counterparts in the Navy sample had been. Career Army men, on the other hand, were not expected to be much different from their Navy counterparts. Such men had (by definition) self-selected to stay, and the historical change from conscription to voluntarism was not expected to be of consequence to the favorableness of their beliefs about the military. For these reasons, we expected that the ideological gap between career-men and non-career men would be reduced; however, we did not expect the gap to be entirely eliminated, since non-career men (by definition) do not have long-term commitments even if they are willing to serve voluntarily for a time.

One further expectation should be noted. We considered it likely that the proportion of servicemen who were career-oriented would be higher under all-volunteer conditions than it was under conscription.

Thus, our hypotheses for the Army data were these:

1. Non-career men in the Army (1974-75) would be more "pro-military" than their Navy (1972-73) counterparts were, since they were serving voluntarily rather than under conditions of actual conscription or draft-motivated enlistment.

2. Career Army men would not be appreciably different from their Navy counterparts (both would be very "pro-military").

3. As a result of (1) and (2) above, the consistent ideological differences found between non-career and career men (for both officers and enlisted men) in the 1972-73 Navy sample would be smaller in the 1974-75 Army sample.

4. The proportion of total military personnel who are career-oriented would be greater in the Army sample than in the Navy sample. (This is indeed the case, as discussed in Chapter 1.)

5. The overall effect of the above would be to increase the ideological differences between military men and civilians (a) because Army non-career men could be expected to be somewhat less ideologically representative of civilians than were Navy non-career men and (b) because the proportion of those who were career-oriented--and hence unrepresentative of their civilian counterparts--was expected to increase.

Before we turn to our analysis of differences in beliefs based on rank and career-orientation, a short clarification of where we are going in this study as a whole is in order. In this chapter, we will examine the nature of the "ideological" cleavages within the military; we will not at this time make any comparisons between civilians and military men. We have already presented our findings on the nature of civilian belief systems concerning the military; before we turn to comparing civilians with military men, we first need to analyze the nature of belief systems among military men. All of Chapter 4 and much of Chapter 5 will be devoted to civil-military comparisons.

Diversity Among Military Men by Career-Orientation and Rank

As our first step in examining the nature of military men's belief systems, we will present an illustrative analysis similar to the one we presented for civilians by age and education in Chapter 2. For simplicity of presentation and comparison, we have dichotomized the many possible rank groups into officers and enlisted men. In addition, we have separated our samples into those who were career-oriented and those who were not.

Throughout this chapter we will be using the first of the seventeen basic measures to illustrate a series of points and introduce the groups to be compared. The measure we will use is

the index of perceived military job opportunity (one measure of attitudes about the military organization). In Figure 3.1 we have presented this measure related to career-orientation and rank. Both Army and Navy groups show clear differences according to the respondents' career-orientation, and the Army data in the figure shows some differences by rank as well. Our analysis, then will focus primarily on career/non-career differences for both officers and enlisted men. However, we will also take note of those differences by rank for both career and non-career military men.

For these comparisons, we will use the same data reduction technique we employed in our analysis of civilians. This analysis is designed to provide a more substantively meaningful picture of the distributions of the beliefs under consideration among military men than would result from an examination of mean scores or measures of associations alone. Also the figures we will use in our comparisons will more graphically present differences according to career-orientation and rank--the hypothesized primary sources of variation in military men's beliefs.

Enlisted Men: Career and Non-Career

In Figure 3.2 we have contrasted the mean scores of both career and non-career enlisted groups with the substantive midpoints of each measure. The middle line represents this midpoint--between those responses that we have termed "anti-military" and those we have designated as "pro-military." The other lines show one-half standard deviation on each side of the midpoint. The mean scores, then, are plotted in terms of standard deviation units based on their relationship to the midpoint.[2]

Non-career enlisted men showed a considerable mixture in their ratings of "the military." They were generally more critical of the military organization and the use of military force than they were of civil-military relations. For example, they were very critical of fair treatment within the military service, of the level

FIGURE 3.1

Military Job Opportunity Index Related to Career-Orientation and Rank for Army and Navy Samples



FIGURE 3.2

Mean Scores of Enlisted Groups Contrasted With Midpoint of Each Measure
For Army and Navy Samples



Center line shows midpoint of each measure; other lines show 1/2 s.d. for all Navy men or all Army men (respectively) on each measure.

of competency of military leaders, and of the organization's demands for unquestioning military obedience. Two other aspects of the military organization fared better in their ratings: discrimination against blacks and women was seen to be low and the military was seen to provide some job opportunities. The use of military force for military intervention, in Vietnam, and in My Lai-type incidents was rejected by these non-career enlisted men, but some support was given for the maintenance of U.S. military supremacy.

Their evaluation of civil-military relations was generally positive--or at least not "anti-military." The current level of military spending was seen to be appropriate; the role of the military in society was viewed as neither negative nor positive; military (versus civilian) influence was perceived to be generally in balance, although more than the present level of military influence was preferred and thus, overall, military influence was seen as inadequate. This latter finding was especially strong in the Army sample. In spite of this preference for somewhat greater military influence, the non-career enlisted men preferred citizen soldiers over career men and supported a wide range of political views among servicemen.

On the other hand, career enlisted men (as a whole) gave consistently "pro-military" responses except for the measure concerning political views. They had divided views on the fairness of treatment in the services and on what soldiers should do in a My Lai situation. In addition, they were also most favorable on issues of civil-military relations--especially in their views of civil-military influence. On most of these measures, the mean scores for these career groups were consistently and very strongly pro-military. This can be seen by the profile lines (which give a general idea of the distribution of the responses because they take both the mean scores and the standard deviations into account).

Finally, let us stress the most basic finding shown in the figure: those enlisted men with career commitments were consistently and very strongly more pro-military than those enlisted men who were leaving the military. Thus, both in an absolute sense (compared to the midpoints) and in a relative sense (compared to non-career men), career-oriented enlisted men were quite pro-military in their views. The next question is whether these career/non-career differences appeared among officers as well.

Officers: Career and Non-Career

In Figure 3.3 we have the information to answer the question raised above. For the Navy, the same pattern of relative differences is found. Career officers were generally more pro-military than non-career officers although some of the differences were not large.[3]

In the aggregate, career officers (in both Army and Navy samples) showed a great consistency in pro-military responses--except for the issues of My Lai and the range of political views, where their responses could be termed "anti-military." In particular, they saw: job opportunities in the military as very good, the competence of military leaders as very high, discrimination as low, the role of military in society as very positive, military influence as very low, amnesty as unacceptable, military intervention as potentially necessary, and "career men" as preferrable. Army career officers were especially supportive of U.S. military supremacy and even more likely to see military influence as inadequate.

Non-career Navy officers, like non-career enlisted men, gave the military mixed ratings. Here, the most consistent set of findings dealt with the use of military force. There was little support for military intervention and for U.S. military supremacy; also, there was a high level of Vietnam dissent as well as strong opposition to obedience in My Lai situations. Both the evaluations of the military organization and civil-military relations were mixed.

FIGURE 3.3

Mean Scores of Officer Groups Contrasted With Midpoint of Each Measure For Army and Navy Samples



Center line shows midpoint of each measure; other lines show 1/2 s.d. for all Navy men or all Army men (respectively) on each measure.

Although the military organization was seen to have low levels of discrimination and to be legitimate in demanding unquestioning military obedience, its job opportunities were not seen as very great, nor was it seen as very fair in its treatment. Its leaders were also not highly evaluated in terms of their competence.

Non-career Navy officers' attitudes about civil-military relations showed this mixture very sharply; the military budget was seen as excessive, the role of the military in society was evaluated as somewhere between positive and negative, but amnesty for draft evaders was seen as wrong. Their views on relative civil-military influence were particularly interesting. They perceived the military as having very low levels of influence vis-a-vis civilians, while their preferences were for only moderately low levels of military influence. Nevertheless, the discrepancy in the magnitude of those views resulted in non-career Navy officers seeing military influence as inadequate.

The non-career officers were the one category for which the Army data did not closely replicate the Navy findings. Whereas the Navy non-career officers in 1972-73 were mixed in their evaluations of the military, the Army non-career officers in 1974-75 were quite consistently pro-military in their beliefs. Thus the Army non-career officers were not very different from career officers in both the Army and the Navy. We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the Army and Navy data.

Differences Between the Navy (1972-1973) and the Army (1974-1975)

On the whole, the Army data, although collected two years later (after the implementation of the All-Volunteer Force) and in a different service, replicated the findings for the Navy remarkably well. For three of the four major analysis groups, the mean scores on the 17 measures are nearly identical. The one area of substantive difference concerns the adequacy of military (versus civilian) influence. Army men of all four groups wanted to see more military influence than did the Navy men.

The fourth Army analysis group--non-career officers--is very different from its Navy counterpart. Navy junior officers without career-commitments were quite similar to non-career enlisted men. Army junior officers without career commitments appeared to be much more like career officers. We had anticipated that an Army replication of the Navy data would find a smaller gap between career and non-career men--both officers and enlisted men. Instead, we found essentially no change in the size of the career/non-career differences among enlisted men and a near elimination of those differences among officers.

Why were the findings for the Army data different than we had hypothesized? At this point we can only speculate on what may have happened and present an admittedly ex post facto explanation. Our interpretation still focuses on issues of self-selection as did our initial hypotheses. However, it has become increasingly clear that conceptualizations of the nature and consequences of self-selection among both officers and enlisted men must be more differentiated than we had originally anticipated.

The consequences of draft conditions may have been overestimated for most enlisted men. Military service performs certain social functions for many young men that attending institutions of higher learning does for their non-military age-mates. In particular, military service provides an opportunity for leaving home and developing higher levels of autonomy and financial independence. It may be that most young, non-career men are joining the Army for other reasons than wanting to be a soldier and that, furthermore, young men in the past also joined for those reasons (although they may have justified their service in terms of actual conscription of draft motivation). The views these non-career enlisted men express about the military may reflect either the attitudes of their civilian age and educational counterparts (whom they match quite closely as will be shown in Chapter 4) or high levels of disappointment with the military organization they have volunteered to join--or some combination of both. Our own guess is that there

is relatively little ideological self-selection among enlisted men who do not have clear career commitments to the military; thus they are essentially representative of their civilian peers in their levels of pro- or anti-military sentiment.

For non-career officers the self-selection process (under all-volunteer conditions) may work quite differently. First it should be noted that the level of self-selection and the length of time it must be sustained must be greater among officers. To be an officer, one must volunteer long before one enters service (which is in sharp contrast to the situation for most enlisted men who may find themselves in the military quite quickly after visiting the recruiter and volunteering). During this long time span prior to actual service one could at any time drop out, e.g., after the second or third year of ROTC. A greater commitment to the military or, at a minimum, a greater acceptance of its legitimacy and purpose may well be required to sustain a potential officer during this period prior to actually accepting a commission and serving. In addition, the social functions concerned with "growing up" should not be as relevant for potential officers who already have that chance in institutions of higher learning. Finally, college graduates are more likely to have more and other options open to them than non-graduates and they may have to be more ideologically self-selected than enlisted men to choose to serve voluntarily.

However, there is also the possibility that our Army data underestimate the differences between career and non-career officers because of historical conditions unique to the Army at this time. Our measure of career-orientation requires only an indication on the part of the respondent that he plans to stay in the Army or not. In studying the Navy we felt that it was a conservative measure; if we could find substantial differences between career and non-career men using only this minimal definition or career-orientation, then there were surely considerable differences

in fact. In the case of the Army, however, the situation is more complex. It is possible that some proportion of the Army officers who indicated that they would be leaving the Army were at one time very career-oriented but at the time of the survey, were expecting to leave because of reductions in force. This condition, if true, should apply primarily to non-career Army Captains who came in during the Vietnam War, stayed on, and now are either directly forced to leave or feel that job opportunities are lacking. (There were only a few cases in the data set of more senior officers who were leaving.) Therefore, in examining the Army data in more detail later in this chapter, we will always distinguish between lieutenants and captains among both career and non-career officer groups. For the Navy junior officers this was not a potential problem, and they are examined as a group (including ensigns, lieutenants junior grade, and lieutenants).

Although the findings (with the exceptions presented above) clearly seem to support our expectations based on the literature, there are alternative approaches to the data which could, perhaps, more accurately "explain" ideological diversity among military men. We will now proceed to a consideration of these other possibilities.

Sources of Variation: Individual or Organizational Characteristics?

The original analyses of the Navy data focused primarily on age--and to some extent on education--as the primary sources of variation among military men as well as among civilians. Strong relationships were found between the age of the Navy men and the various measures under consideration (see Bachman, 1973). In addition, education was also found to be an important source of differences in beliefs concerning the military (Bachman, 1973, 1974; Bowers and Bachman, 1974). On the other hand, the arguments presented above focus on organizational characteristics such as career-orientation and rank rather than on individual characteristics such as age and education. The problem is complicated because age

and career-orientation are highly interrelated, as are education and rank. Most younger men in both the Navy and the Army were not career-oriented and were planning to leave; most older men in the military were career-oriented and were staying. In addition, most officers were college graduates; most enlisted men were not.

Blair (1975) presented the age and educational distributions for the four Navy career and rank groups we have been considering. The same relationships are found for the four Army groups. Age is clearly related to career-orientation; education is equally clearly related to rank. We have also analyzed the racial, region of origin, community of origin, and parental education distributions for the four groups in each sample.

There are some differences in the distributions among the four groups, e.g., career-men were more likely to come from rural areas and small towns and to have less educated parents than their non-career counterparts; and officers were less likely to be black than enlisted men. These differences, however, are generally not large and could not account for the clear differences we found between those who were career-oriented and those who were not (nor could they account for the less strong differences).

On the other hand, the differences between career groups in age distributions, and the discrepancies between rank groups in education, could provide alternative explanations for the findings presented above. Blair (1975) presented a detailed examination of both variables we have termed "organizational characteristics" and those we have called "individual characteristics" in an attempt to sort out alternative explanations for the diversity in belief systems of military men.

Several aspects of those analyses should be noted:

1. Background variables <u>alone</u> generally did not have much relative predictive power compared to age and education or career-orientation and rank. The strongest exception is the one dealing with perceptions of racial and sex discrimination in the military, and this is primarily a reflection of racial differences among the respondents.

2. Organizational characteristics of the respondent as reflected by his rank and career-orientation seem to be the best overall predictors, and match or exceed the predictive power of the two most powerful individual predictors--age and education.

3. However, it should also be clear that there is a great overlap between individual characteristics and organizational characteristics of the respondents.

4. Parallel analyses for the Army data showed the same kinds of relationships. Once again, organizational characteristics were the best overall predictors of beliefs concerning the military. In addition, there was an equally large overlap between the organizational characteristics of career-orientation and rank and the individual characteristics of age and education.

5. Interestingly, however, other organizational characteristics, which we had anticipated would predict military ideology among Army men, failed to show any independent contribution to the explanation of the variance in the measures. Whether or not an Army man was in the combat arms showed no independent effects once career-orientation and rank were controlled. The same is true for kinds of combat experience in Vietnam or the number of tours in Vietnam.

Blair (1975) demonstrated how age operates primarily as a proxy for career-orientation, i.e., how age appears to be the source of variation (or determinant or cause of differences) when, in reality, the primary source of differences in beliefs among military men is their career-orientation or lack of it. The reader should keep in mind that the statistical relationships we find between age and the 17 measures are neither false nor spurious; what is spurious is the <u>interpretation</u> of the relationships in terms of differences in age leading to differences in beliefs rather than in terms of differences in career-orientation as the primary link to diversity in beliefs.

In addition to the statistical manipulations which have shown age to be a proxy variable, there is another approach to this question. If age and education (individual characteristics) were really more important in predicting ideology among military men than are their rank and career-orientation (organizational characteristics), then we should be able to predict what the attitudes of military groups should be, based on the beliefs of similar groups of civilians--their age and educational counterparts. Generally, age has the same relationship to the measures we are examining among civilians as it does among military men--but it is much weaker among civilians. Education, on the other hand, relates to the military views of civilians quite differently than in the case of military men; specifically, better educated civilians were consistently more anti-military; whereas better educated military men (officers) were either more pro-military or else the differences were very small.

Most importantly, when (in Chapter 4 below) we compare career men to their civilian age and educational counterparts, they are consistently and substantially different than would have been predicted based on their age and education. (The same finding applies to non-career Army officers as well.) Having determined, then, that the organizational characteristics of military men are the most important sources of differences in their beliefs concerning the military, we now turn to a more detailed examination of those differences.

Organizational Characteristics and Diversity Among Military Men

Diversity Among Enlisted Men

Returning to the example of perceived military job opportunities, in Figure 3.4 we see once again the clear distinctions between those who were career-oriented and those who were not. In addition, there are some differences among career-men which could reflect greater

FIGURE 3.4

Military Job Opportunity Index Related to Career and Non-Career Enlisted Groups for Army and Navy Samples



military professionalism, i.e., the senior Non Commissioned Officers (NCO's) were more pro-military than career-oriented, but more junior, enlisted men or NCO's. Once again, one must not forget that the most substantial and most consistent differences lie between those men who were and those who were not career-oriented.

In Tables 3.1 and 3.2 we have detailed information for five enlisted groups in each military sample. For over half of the measures, there are not only the career/non-career differences found in <u>all</u> of them, but also differences by "stage in career" or level of rank among career men. More senior NCO's were more pro-military than younger enlisted men, who were career-oriented as well, in terms of their perceptions of military job opportunities, perceptions of fair treatment, perceptions of discrimination, perceptions of military (versus civilian) influence, perceptions of adequacy of influence, support for military intervention, lack of Vietnam dissent, opposition to amnesty, support for unquestioning military obediance, and support for obedience in a My Lai-type incident.

On the other hand, non-career junior enlisted men were even more anti-military than non-career junior NCO's in some cases, such as perceptions about military (versus civilian) influence and the adequacy of that influence, support for military intervention, and amnesty.

In summary we have seen that the primary source of diversity among enlisted men is based on career-orientation. In addition, senior career enlisted men are more pro-military than junior career men, although that difference is neither universal nor as strong as the one based on career-orientation. Also, among the non-career-oriented, junior enlisted men are generally somewhat more anti-military than junior NCO's.

Diversity Among Officers

Once again we return to a graphic example of the variations we are examining. In Figure 3.5 we display the mean scores of five groups of Navy officers and six groups of Army officers on the index of perceived military job opportunities. One should immediately take note that there are only 19 of the more senior Navy officers who are not career-oriented. They have proved to be an interesting group, but the reader must remember that the small sample size may not provide very accurate estimates of the attitudes of officers in this category. However, the findings are consistent with our expectations that these were, presumably, once career-oriented officers who are disillusioned with the Navy (or, alternatively, the Navy with them). This is quite different from the expectations we have for non-career Army captains who, presumably, are being forced out to reduce the size of the Army. (The sample sizes are also small for several Army groups.)

In this figure the career/non-career distinction remains solid for Navy officers. The senior officers who are getting out are most anti-military and may reflect the disillusionment mentioned above. More senior officers and warrant officers (who are also older) are the most pro-military.

Among Army officers, the career/non-career differences in Figure 3.5 were considerably less than those found for the Navy. There were also basically no differences between non-career lieutenants and captains concerning perceptions of military job opportunities.

In Table 3.3 the mean scores for the five Navy officer groups are presented. For Navy officers, career/non-career differences are consistent here as well as in the two illustrations above. Generally the most anti-military group consists of the senior officers on their way out. Warrant officers and senior commissioned officers are the most pro-military. However, the main finding of Table 3.3 reinforces once again our conclusion

TABLE 3.1
Mean Scores for Navy Career and Non-Career Enlisted Groups

	Non-Career		Career		
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Junior Enl. Men	Junior NCO's	Junior Enl. Men	Junior NCO's	Senior NCO's
(N):	(876)	(235)	(191)	(408)	(273)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	2.97	2.92	3.68	3.67	3.95
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	1.96	1.96	2.85	2.93	3.20
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.36	2.38	2.46	2.22	2.11
MILITARY LEADERSHIP					
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	2.62	2.73	3.30	3.42	3.76
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY					
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.95	3.03	3.49	3.73	3.53
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.46	2.45	2.13	2.12	2.16
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.08	2.42	2.79	2.07	1.82
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.30	3.27	3.74	3.77	3.60
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	3.79	3.16	3.05	2.30	2.22
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER					
Support for Military Intervention	2.19	2.43	2.58	2.80	2.98
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.69	2.61	3.17	3.19	3.24
Vietnam Dissent	2.68	2.69	2.29	2.16	2.06
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE					
Support for Amnesty	2.66	2.11	2.09	1.44	1.25
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.87	2.69	2.32	2.04	1.94
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.19	2.37	1.91	1.94	2.06
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.69	2.43	2.44	2.11	2.04
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.74	2.91	2.79	2.75	2.71

TABLE 3.2

Mean Scores for Army Career and Non-Career Enlisted Groups

	Non-Career		Career		
	Junior Enl. Men	Junior NCO's	Junior Enl. Men	Junior NCO's	Senior NCO's
(N)	(704)	(175)	(255)	(449)	(225)
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE					
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	2.97	3.08	3.58	3.84	4.13
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.12	2.20	2.84	3.18	3.41
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.41	2.44	2.50	2.52	2.24
MILITARY LEADERSHIP					
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	2.53	2.59	3.10	3.23	3.58
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY					
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	3.16	3.30	3.69	3.88	3.95
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.54	2.45	2.31	2.23	2.19
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.02	2.39	3.00	2.17	1.89
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.51	3.70	3.95	4.09	4.04
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc.-Pref.)	3.50	2.69	3.05	2.08	1.85
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER					
Support for Military Intervention	2.15	2.39	2.41	2.65	2.85
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.82	2.94	3.09	3.30	3.41
Vietnam Dissent	2.67	2.60	2.37	2.24	2.16
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE					
Support for Amnesty	2.67	1.96	2.17	1.56	1.29
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.96	2.83	2.41	2.27	2.29
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.27	2.36	2.07	2.19	2.23
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.77	2.48	2.43	2.05	1.99
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.78	2.95	2.73	2.75	2.71

FIGURE 3.5

Military Job Opportunity Index Related to Career and Non-Career Officer Groups for Army and Navy Samples



that it is career-orientation that makes the primary difference among Navy officers as it did among enlisted men.

The pattern of weaker career/non-career differences among Army officers is reflected in Table 3.4. There were also only modest differences between non-career lieutenants (the least career-oriented group) and non-career captains (a group that may have been career-oriented at one time as indicated above). Hence, even the group of Army officers (non-career lieutenants) most likely to parallel the junior officers in the Navy was still quite similar in ideology to the career officer groups.

Attitude Change or Self-Selection?

The findings reported throughout this chapter are very consistent in showing strong career/non-career differences among enlisted men and Navy officers. The pattern for Army officers is somewhat more complicated, but also raises the issue of ideological self-selection. In the next chapter we will see that career-men are not only different from non-career servicemen, but from their civilian age and educational counterparts as well. Even the non-career Army officers will be shown to be substantially different in their beliefs from their civilian peers. In our discussion of the findings to this point, we have generally stressed the importance of self-selection as the probable cause of these differences. But that is not the only possible explanation.

We can distinguish two quite different explanations for the strongly pro-military views of career men in the Army and the Navy:

1. During the first tour of duty, those individuals most likely to reenlist may undergo attitude changes in a more pro-military direction. This may occur through a process of socialization as a result of exposure to the more experienced military men who tend to hold such views, or through exposure to positive

TABLE 3.3

Mean Scores for Navy Career and Non-Career Officer Groups

	Non-Career		Career		
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Junior Officers	Senior Officers	Junior Officers	Senior Officers	Warrant Officers
(N):	(66)	(19)	(80)	(110)	(32)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.00	2.65	3.73	4.03	3.96
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.39	2.15	3.04	3.39	3.36
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.75	2.44	2.48	2.28	2.11
MILITARY LEADERSHIP					
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	2.96	2.63	3.59	3.97	3.88
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY					
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.40	1.94	3.28	3.20	3.56
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.43	2.63	2.10	2.01	2.18
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.44	2.49	2.17	1.91	1.70
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.78	2.74	3.20	3.08	3.18
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	3.66	3.76	2.97	2.83	2.52
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER					
Support for Military Intervention	2.43	2.29	2.87	2.95	3.03
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.31	2.34	2.77	2.87	3.13
Vietnam Dissent	2.96	3.12	2.51	2.26	2.01
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE					
Support for Amnesty	2.22	2.24	1.73	1.30	1.11
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.40	2.44	2.27	2.22	2.19
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.54	2.63	2.41	2.47	2.16
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.47	2.79	2.11	2.08	1.84
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	3.27	3.39	3.04	3.14	2.89

TABLE 3.4

Mean Scores for Army Career and Non-Career Officer Groups

	Non-Career		Career			
(N)	2nd/1st LT (25)	Cpt (12)	2nd/1st LT (55)	Captain (55)	Senior (44)	Warrant (39)
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE						
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.40	3.35	4.02	3.91	3.96	3.72
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.70	2.65	3.35	3.28	3.41	2.97
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.42	2.00	2.11	2.22	2.24	1.85
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3.46	3.33	3.82	3.99	3.74	3.60
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER MILITARY POLICY						
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	3.32	3.42	3.86	3.66	3.57	3.77
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.28	2.17	2.11	2.13	2.16	2.23
Perc. of Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.33	2.02	2.01	1.92	2.01	1.72
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.30	3.52	3.56	3.43	3.32	3.71
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc.-Pref.)	3.02	2.50	2.45	2.49	2.69	2.01
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	2.64	2.91	3.18	2.95	3.18	2.97
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.70	2.83	2.91	2.79	2.90	3.22
Vietnam Dissent	2.51	2.32	2.30	2.27	2.21	2.15
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support for Amnesty	1.88	1.50	1.52	1.62	1.44	1.22
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.64	2.58	2.27	2.44	2.50	2.31
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.64	2.75	2.69	2.89	2.84	2.49
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.68	2.67	2.06	1.96	2.40	2.04
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	3.28	3.21	2.91	3.06	3.22	3.13

experiences in the service, or both.

2. By the time they reach their late teens, some individuals may be more favorable than others in their view of the military services and mission. These differences, which exist prior to enlistment, may be among the factors influencing the self-selection process involved in the decision to reenlist.

While the only really adequate test of these two competing explanations would involve a longitudinal design, we felt we could gain some insights by looking separately at first-term enlisted men who had served about one year, those who had served two years, and those who had served three or four years. If self-selection accounts for the differences between the attitudes of the career military men and others, there should be consistent differences in attitudes between those who did and did not plan on reenlistment--i.e., the differences for those in their first year should be just as large on the average as the differences found for those in their second, third or fourth years of service. On the other hand, if the attitude change explanation is correct, we might expect to see smaller differences among those in their first year--assuming that the process of attitude change requires more than a few months to be completed.

Our basic finding was that the differences between first-termers who planned to reenlist, and those who did not, were evident quite early. Those who had served about one year showed differences just as large on the average as those who had served several years longer. This finding is fully consistent with the self-selection explanation--the view that reenlistment is heavily influenced by rather deeply rooted perceptions and ideology related to the military life-style and mission. The alternative explanation, based on attitude changes during the first tour of duty, is not ruled out entirely. Indeed, both explanations could be true to some degree. But whatever the pattern of causation, our analyses in this area demonstrate that it does not require years and years of service experience for first-term enlisted

men to develop the strongly pro-military attitudes found among later-termers. For those who planned to reenlist, the same attitudes were clearly evident as early as the first year of service.

In addition, differences in mean scores at different rank levels, e.g. among career enlisted men or career officers, raise the issue of whether these reflect the effects of "real" or "professional" socialization as opposed to "anticipatory" socialization. In other words, are there additional effects of socialization after one is in the organization and exposed to its training, constraints, and opportunities? We have mentioned in our discussion of the literature that such socialization is one of the four basic homogenization processes. This issue is a variant of the basic socialization versus self-selection question which we have just discussed. Our comparison of those first-term enlisted men who were career-oriented with those who were not--at each year of service--generally supported the idea of self-selection, not socialization, but that analysis dealt neither with more senior military personnel nor with officers. It is possible that there is real socialization in addition to the anticipatory socialization associated with self-selection. In our data, however, years of service (and level of rank among officers and among enlisted men) are so highly associated with age that we have not been able to sort out age effects from those of possible socialization resulting from years of exposure to the organization. The cross-sectional nature of the data make the entire issue speculative in any case. We expect that all of the processes of homogenization are at work on career-oriented military personnel. However, we cannot with these data provide a detailed comparison of possible socialization effects with general life cycle, generational, or period effects.

Summary and Conclusions

Our examination of belief systems concerning the military found among military men has been based on representative samples of Navy and Army personnel. The former data were collected in late 1972 and early 1973 and the latter in late 1974 and early 1975. In this chapter we have stressed several different themes.

First, there is a lack of a definitive pro-military stance among military men as a whole. Aggregate responses would mask the large amount of diversity among military men in terms of their beliefs.

Second, careful examination of the sources of variation in attitudes showed that age acts as a proxy variable for career-orientation which is the primary cleavage among military men. Career military men were, in terms of the substantive meanings of their mean scores, almost exclusively pro-military concerning all aspects of the military. Non-career men, although consistently different from their career counterparts (except for non-career Army officers), were much more mixed in their evaluation--as we found (in Chapter 2) for the civilian population to which they were returning.

Third, rank also shows some important differences in attitudes among military men independent of their career-orientation. Enlisted men were somewhat more supportive of the use of military force. Officers, on the other hand, were somewhat more positive in their evaluation of the military organization. In terms of civil-military relations, officers were more likely to perceive military (verus civilian) influence to be low, but enlisted men were more likely to prefer greater military (versus civilian) influence. However, as a result, both saw military (versus civilian) influence to be inadequate. Non-career men also saw military influence as inadequate, but to a lesser degree. In that respect, it is worth recalling from Chapter 2 that this perception that the "military

industrial complex" does not exist--or that the military is a very junior partner--was also one of the clearest differences between veterans and non-veterans.

Finally, therefore, we have found that the hypothesized historical change in the cleavages within the military was supported by the Navy findings. Career-orientation was a more important source of "ideological" cleavage than were rank differences.

However, the findings for non-career Army officers suggests that rank differences are once again coming to the fore with junior, non-career officers no longer being ideologically similar to junior, non-career enlisted men. If this is an indication of a secular trend--a shift from 1972-73 to 1974-75--then there may be at least two major kinds of consequences.

First, junior enlisted men who are not career-oriented will be increasingly distinct as a group with no authority figures that share their beliefs, i.e., NCO's (the bulk of the career-oriented enlisted men), senior officers and even most junior officers will not share the same world view--at least concerning the military and its mission. Secondly, there will be an increase in homogeneity of military men's belief systems as all the groups which wield either formal (officers) or informal (NCO's) organizational power show similarity in their beliefs. This whole question of homogeneity of beliefs will be examined in the next chapter.

Finally, we examined the issues of self-selection versus socialization. Although our findings cannot be definitive because of the cross-sectional nature of the samples, it appears that career/non-career differences and the Army/Navy differences for non-career officers are a reflection of the self-selecting of men from primarily one part of the ideological spectrum to pursue careers in the military or to be officers in an all-volunteer context.

Footnotes

[1]Although we have treated them as conceptually distinct, rank and career-orientation are empirically related in our sample, i.e., a higher proportion of officers than enlisted men are career-oriented.

[2]The actual mean scores and deviations from the midpoint for Figure 3.2 (and also Figure 3.3) can be found in Appendix D, specifically Tables D3.1 and D3.2 for the Navy and D3.3 and D3.4 for the Army. Generally, a difference between the two enlisted groups (either Army of Navy) of more than .09 or .15 standard deviation units is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ or $p < .001$ level (two-tailed) respectively. (The usual significance tests have been developed for strict random samples, whereas the military and civilian samples used in the present study are based on multi-stage stratified probability sampling with some degree of clustering. There exist some rather complex methods for estimating significance levels with such samples; however, for our present purposes it will be adequate to use the significance tests for random samples, particularly if we rely on the more stringent .001 criterion rather than the usual .05 level.)

[3]Generally, a difference between the two officer groups of more than .25 or .42 standard deviation units for the Navy, and .32 or .54 for the Army, is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ or $p < .001$ level (two-tailed) respectively.

CHAPTER 4

SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND CIVILIANS: A COMPARISON

The Distinctiveness of the "Military Mind"

The distinctiveness of the military mind is generally accepted by critics (Mills, 1956; Perucci and Pilisuk, 1971) as well as supporters (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Moskos, 1970). The argument, which is well developed in Abrahamsson (1972), is that its general distinctiveness comes as a result of it being a "professional mind" as compared to that of the general population. In addition, the military as a profession exhibits more homogeneity as a result of its homogenization processes and a more positive assessment of its own profession (and "the military" more generally). Janowitz (1960) also indicated that although higher education generally is linked to liberalism, the opposite is true for professional military men.

The specific distinctiveness of the military belief system is based on the nature of the military and its functions--the military way (Vagts, 1937). As professionals in violence (Janowitz, 1960), military men are part of an organizational system with the capacity to commit and deal with the consequences of mass violence (Van Doorn, 1974). The perspective of the military man is based on the willingness--as well as the capacity--to eliminate dysfunctional elements from the social (or organizational) system's environment (if so defined by legitimate authorities).

There are several problematic areas not adequately dealt with in the previous work on the distinctiveness of military men's belief systems. Much of the past research on this question is too narrowly focused on military elites (Angell, 1965; Abrahamsson, 1968, Russett, 1974). Even comparing civilian elites with the popu-

lation as a whole usually results in showing the distinctiveness of the elites (McClosky, 1958; Converse, 1964; Robinson and Hefner, 1958). Another problem has been the kinds of samples available (cf. Bengtsson, 1968). Clearly, a next step is to compare a broader sample of military men with their civilian peers.

The literature, then, argues persuasively for the distinctiveness of the belief system concerning the military found among military men. In the preceeding chapter we showed a clear differentiation between military men in our samples who were career-oriented and those who were not in terms of their respective belief systems. Hence, we expect this distinctiveness from civilians to exist--if it does--primarily among career military men. In addition, we expect career officers, who have been most subject to the series of homogenization processes, to be the most distinctive in terms of their beliefs about the military.

The next question to be dealt with is: How can one establish the distinctiveness (or lack of it) of the belief system found among military men? In the preceeding chapters we have used the same general analytical approaches we will use here to examine the specific question of civil-military differentiation in belief systems. They are:

1. Comparison of factor scores for both military and civilian groups, with the expectation that military men would have more highly constrained or structured belief systems (cf. Converse, 1964) and, thus, show a clearer factor structure and higher levels of explained variance in the factor analysis.

2. Comparison of mean scores of the 17 measures of beliefs concerning various aspects of the military, with the expectation that military men would be more "pro-military" than civilians.

3. Comparison of the statistical variance on the 17 measures for both military and civilian groups, with the general expectation that the standard deviations among military men would be less than among civilians, i.e., military men would exhibit more

homogeneity than civilians.

A very similar approach has recently been used by Russett (1974) to examine the political perspectives of military and business elites. The military mind hypothesis would clearly predict differences in all three of these aspects of belief systems. Thus, a systematic examination of the question of military belief system distinctiveness requires this more multi-faceted approach.

Belief System Structure: Factor Analyses

Bachman (1974) performed a series of factor analyses of the measures under study for six Navy and civilian groups: first-term Navy enlisted men, later-term Navy enlisted men, Navy officers, civilian men, civilian women, and civilian male college graduates. The results are reproduced here in Table B.2 (Appendix B). Although we have used somewhat different groups for our analyses in this study, the results of those factor analyses are relevant here. For each group, a general factor of "pro-military sentiment" emerged that included all the same items with basically similar factor loadings. In other words, individuals in each civilian or military group are ordered in a very similar fashion on each of the 17 measures of beliefs; hence, no evidence of distinctiveness is provided.

In addition, the amount of variance (in the intercorrelations of the beliefs of each group) explained by the factor analyses was similar across groups. Navy officers initially seemed to have a more highly constrained and thus more explainable set of beliefs than other Navy groups; but the analyses of civilian college graduate males showed the same higher level of structure. The actual variance explained by this factor of "pro-military sentiment" for each group was as follows (Bachman, 1974): first-term Navy enlisted men (28.4%), later-term Navy enlisted men (23.1%), Navy officers (36.1%), civilian men (29.5%), civilian women (26.5%), civilian male college graduates (40.1%). Thus, the factor analyses do not reveal any pattern of greater belief system constraint among military men than found among similar civilian groups.

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SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND CIVILIANS: THE 'MILITARY MIND' AND THE AL--ETC(U)
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

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Russett (1974) found that the business elite had even more highly interrelated attitudes than the military elite. With these data from Navy and civilian cross-sectional samples, however, civil-military differences are small and mixed. Bachman's findings, therefore show no support for the military mind hypothesis using this mode of analysis.

Civil-Military Comparisons: Mean Scores

In this section, we will use the second means of examining the question of military distinctiveness in beliefs, i.e., a comparison of mean scores. However, as the argument concerning the military mind as a professional mind alerts us, it is important to find comparable civilian groups. For example, Russett's (1974) study used two elite samples: the military elite consisted of military war college students from all the branches and was contrasted with a comparable level business elite.

In our study, we do not have elite military samples. Instead, we have representative cross-sections of Army and Navy men. Thus, we will attempt to find comparable groups from our civilian sample. In Chapter 2 we saw that age and education were generally the most important civilian background characteristics in terms of predicting beliefs about the military. In Chapter 3 we found that career-orientation and rank were the most important cleavages within the Army and Navy samples in terms of these beliefs.

For simplicity of data presentation and analysis, we will compare several distinct groups of military personnel and civilians. The four military groups are familiar from the preceeding chapter: career officers, non-career officers, career enlisted men, and non-career enlisted men. The civilian groups are defined in terms of their age and education but do not directly correspond to the civilian groups used in Chapter 2. These civilian groups are not discrete subsamples of respondents as is the case for

the military groups. They overlap each other to some extent in age and education.

Although the military groups are discrete in terms of their organizational characteristics (career-orientation and rank), they are not discrete in terms of their age and education. We have chosen to put together groups of civilians which match them quite well in this respect in order to control for the effects of age and education in our comparisons. Non-career enlisted men will be compared to all youth 19-24, non-career-officers to younger college graduates, career-enlisted men to all non-college graduates (weighted for age) and career-officers to all college graduates.[1]

We have compared these groups in terms of their age and education. We feel that the civilian groups are similar enough in these respects to be considered the age and education counterparts of the respective military groups. We will use them in both our analysis of mean scores that follows and our later examination of standard deviations.

Civilian and Military Views of the Military

In Chapter 3 we examined the four military groups in terms of the relationships of their mean scores to the substantive midpoints of the 17 measures. The focus of this analysis will be different. We will examine the four groups in terms of the relationship of their mean scores to the mean scores of their civilian counterparts on the 17 measures. In other words, we will not look at their scores in the absolute sense (of substantive meaning) but in the relative sense (compared to their civilian age/education counterparts).

In Tables D4.1 and D4.3 (Appendix D) the mean scores of the four civilian counterpart groups are given. In Tables D4.2 and D4.4 the scores are reported in terms of their relationship to the substantive midpoint of each measure. The scores for the military groups are those reported in Chapter 3; the four

civilian groups do not correspond to those found in Chapter 2, however, and their scores should be examined.

Although we will not go into a detailed analysis of these groups (which overlap among themselves considerably in terms of age and education), the scores should be noted for the two younger groups (younger college graduates and youth 19-24) which will be compared to the non-career military groups. Both civilian groups expressed quite anti-military positions in the aggregate. This is especially true for the younger college graduates, but applies to youth 19-24 as well. This generally anti-military posture of the civilian counterparts should be kept in mind when comparisons to non-career servicemen are made below.

College graduates as a whole were less negative but were also generally unfavorable to most aspects of the military except those dealing with military organization. Non-graduates, whose data are weighted here to better reflect the younger age of career enlisted men, were the most positive and showed more of the "mixed reviews" given the military which were found among civilians as a whole in Chapter 2.

To facilitate our comparisons, we have charted the mean scores for each military group according to the extent to which they differ from the mean scores for the appropriate civilian comparison group. The differences are expressed as proportions of the standard deviations for all civilians (on the 17 measures).

These comparisons allow us to look at the relative pro-or anti-military position of each military group on each measure in terms of the location of its civilian counterpart group. The deviations of the military group scores from the mean scores of their respective civilian comparison groups (expressed in standard deviation units) are presented in Table D4.5 (in Appendix D).

Enlisted Men and Their Civilian Counterparts

In Figure 4.1 we have contrasted career and non-career Navy enlisted men with their civilian counterparts.[2] Several aspects of the figure are particularly interesting. Non-career enlisted men did not show consistently more favorable or unfavorable views of the military than did youth 19-24. They were more negative in their evaluation of the military organization (except for seeing less racial and sexual discrimination). But they were more positive in their evaluation of civil-military relations. This was especially true concerning military spending and perceptions of relative military versus civilian influence (which was also, then, reflected in evaluations of the adequacy of military influence). Equally interesting was the basic lack of difference concerning the use of military force and most issues involved in an all-volunteer force.

Career enlisted men, on the other hand, were in most respects more pro-military than their civilian counterparts. This was especially true in terms of civil-military relations; career men were more likely to want higher military spending and to perceive relative military versus civilian influence as low and thus inadequate. The conclusion to be drawn from Figure 4.1 is that career enlisted men were not only consistently different from non-career enlisted men (as demonstrated in Chapter 3), but also consistently more distinct from civilians of comparable age and education.

FIGURE 4.1

Career and Non-Career Army and Navy Enlisted Men Contrasted With Civilian Comparison Groups



Center line shows mean for respective civilian comparison group; other lines show 1/2 s.d. for all civilians on each measure.

Officers and Their Civilian Counterparts

In Figure 4.2 we have contrasted the mean scores of the career and non-career officer groups with their respective civilian comparison groups.[3] The picture for career officers is very much like that for career enlisted men, but for non-career officers the findings are a good deal more complex.

Career officers were consistently more pro-military than their civilian comparison group--all college graduates. This was true for virtually all aspects of the military. Officers viewed treatment in the services as being very fair and, not surprisingly, they viewed military leaders as quite competent. The officers, compared with civilian college graduates, also viewed civil-military relations in a very pro-military light, preferred higher military spending, and saw military (versus civilian) influence in military affairs as lower than it ought to be.

In their views about the use of military force, career officers were generally much more interventionist than civilian college graduates, and also more supportive of the particular intervention in Vietnam. However, they equalled or exceeded civilians in their opposition to obedience in a My Lai-type situation--an inappropriate and unprofessional use of military force.

The non-career officers, as we noted in Chapter 3, were the one category for which the Army data did not closely replicate the Navy findings. Army non-career officers were not all that sharply different from career officers in their mean scores (see Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3). Now, when we contrast them with their civilian counterparts--younger college graduates--in Figure 4.2, we see an even closer similarity to career officers.

FIGURE 4.2

Career and Non-Career Army and Navy Officers Contrasted With Civilian Comparison Groups



Center line shows mean for respective civilian comparison group; other lines show 1/2 s.d. for all civilians on each measure.

Navy non-career officers, on the other hand, showed a more mixed set of ratings when compared with younger civilian college graduates. Compared with these civilians, these officers saw military leaders as relatively low in influence--a perception held to an even stronger degree by the other officer groups. Along some of the other dimensions the Navy non-career officers were a bit more pro-military than their civilian counterparts, but along other dimensions the differences in means were very small or non-existent. Certainly the overall impression is that this group of officers was not nearly so distinct from their civilian counterparts as were the other officer groups.

To sum up this section comparing various military groups with their civilian counterparts, we find that career military men--both officers and enlisted men--were strongly and consistently more favorable to the military. Non-career men showed fewer and less consistent differences; in some cases they were more pro-military than their civilian counterparts but in other cases they were not. Therefore, this mode of analysis provides considerable support for the military mind hypothesis--but only for career men.

Civilian Heterogeneity and Military Homogeneity in Beliefs

The third approach we will use in examining the question of the distinctiveness of military beliefs from civilian beliefs is to look at the variance of these beliefs as a measure of consensus or homogeneity about the aspect of the military measured. The various homogenization processes should have effects not only on the location of mean scores but on the size of the standard deviations as well. Standard deviations should be smaller among military men than among civilians. They should also be smaller among career men than non-career men. Finally, they should be smaller among officers than enlisted men.

In Tables 4.1 and 4.2 we have presented the standard deviations for the four Army groups, the four Navy groups, and six civilian groups. Although mean scores were not significantly different between men and women (see Chapter 2), there were some differences in standard deviations on the items. Women generally had smaller standard deviations than men. Hence, where we are examining the standard deviations of career Navy groups (the groups most likely to be distinctive in this regard as they were for mean scores), we have presented the standard deviations for both men and women to control for sex differences. The non-graduates have not been weighted by age in this analysis, but have been combined to produce a single standard deviation for each sex group.

Non-Career Officers and Enlisted Men

In Table 4.1 we can directly compare the standard deviations of non-career men with those of their civilian age and educational peers. Differences between officers and younger college graduates in terms of which group has greater or lesser variance in their scores were mostly small and essentially random. Much the same pattern was true for non-career enlisted men and youth 19-24. There seems little evidence that there were any consistent differences in the levels of homogeneity of civilians and those military men who were leaving.

Career Officers and Career Enlisted Men

The situation is quite different when we look at career military men and their civilian counterparts--male or female--in Table 4.2. There was a very consistent pattern among both officers, and a fairly consistent pattern among enlisted men, to be more homogeneous than their civilian peers. Most of the exceptions to that rule were found among the women's

standard deviations. In addition, there were very consistent differences between officers and enlisted men--a pattern not found among comparable civilian groups where differences between college graduates and non-graduates were essentially random.

There is one last comparison to make using Tables 4.1 and 4.2. That comparison is between career men and non-career men. For both officers and enlisted men, there were fairly consistent differences between those who were career-oriented and those who were not. Career-oriented men showed more consensus or homogeneity in their beliefs than did non-career men.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined the basic question of whether military men are distinctive from civilians in their beliefs concerning the military. To do so, we have applied three different types of data analysis. In the last two we directly contrasted Army and Navy subgroups with their civilian counterparts (matched for age and education).

First, we examined the extent of structure among beliefs and reported prior factor analyses of these data. These analyses did not reveal any greater attitudinal consistency (higher intercorrelations) among military men than among civilians. Thus, this approach yielded no evidence in support of the military mind hypothesis.

Second, we looked at measures of central tendency in the responses given by both military men and civilians. We contrasted the mean scores of four Army and four Navy groups, defined by career-orientation and rank, with the mean scores of civilian groups comparable in age and education. In looking, then, at the relative pro- or anti-military posture of servicemen, we found that career men--both officers and enlisted--were consistently more pro-military than their civilian age and education counterparts. Non-career men

TABLE 4.1

Standard Deviations for Non-Career-Oriented Military Men and Civilian Comparison Groups

MILITARY WORK ROLE	Non-Career Officers		Younger Coll. Grads	Non-Career Enl. Men		Youth 19-24
	Navy (85)	Army (45)	(116)	Navy (1134)	Army (887)	(249)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	.75	.92	.85	.82	.98	.88
Perceived Fair Treatment in Service	.92	.92	.85	.82	.92	.91
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	.96	1.01	1.05	.96	1.03	1.03
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	.91	.81	.94	.90	.97	1.03
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY						
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	.93	.84	.85	1.18	1.22	.98
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	.75	.67	.73	.71	.79	.77
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	.82	.74	1.04	1.04	1.01	1.02
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	.65	.64	.72	.78	.86	.82
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. -Pref.)	1.20	.95	1.27	1.38	1.38	1.44
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	.75	.72	.66	.79	.83	.75
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	.86	.80	.75	.87	.87	.88
Vietnam Dissent	.69	.74	.67	.65	.63	.70
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support of Amnesty	1.04	.83	1.12	1.08	1.13	1.08
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	.85	.97	.84	.93	.98	.97
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	.68	.68	.72	.74	.80	.76
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	.90	.75	.79	.85	.80	.78
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	.70	.80	.71	.76	.72	.75

TABLE 4.2

Standard Deviations for Career-Oriented Military Men and Civilian Comparison Groups

	Career Officers		College Grads		Career Enl. Men		Non-Grads	
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE (N):	Navy (223)	Army (194)	Men (133)	Women (109)	Navy (867)	Army (934)	Men (583)	Women (887)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	.69	.63	.91	.76	.79	.82	.88	.88
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	.85	.85	.91	.73	.87	.98	.92	.82
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	.89	.82	1.03	1.03	.94	1.04	1.05	1.01
MILITARY LEADERSHIP								
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	.75	.65	.99	.91	.86	.89	1.01	.82
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY								
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	.84	.73	.85	.85	.89	.90	.95	.84
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	.54	.64	.73	.68	.62	.72	.73	.61
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	.72	.52	1.04	1.12	.87	.96	1.01	1.08
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	.59	.66	.83	.68	.72	.73	.87	.80
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	.92	.88	1.30	1.36	1.09	1.19	1.32	1.27
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER								
Support for Military Intervention	.71	.72	.75	.80	.81	.91	.80	.79
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	.74	.73	.83	.89	.70	.74	.89	.84
Vietnam Dissent	.63	.63	.75	.82	.63	.68	.72	.70
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE								
Support for Amnesty	.70	.62	1.15	1.08	.80	.89	1.06	1.08
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	.68	.83	.96	.90	.80	.95	.96	.96
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	.75	.61	.84	.59	.76	.84	.80	.68
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	.77	.72	.88	.83	.82	.77	.83	.84
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	.72	.78	.86	.73	.78	.79	.80	.80

were in some respects more pro-military than their civilian counterparts, but in other respects they were not. In particular, non-career men were more pro-military on issues of civil-military relations, i.e., military spending, perceptions of military versus civilian influence (and, thus, adequacy of military influence), and amnesty. They were generally quite similar to their civilian counterparts on most ther issues, except that non-career enlisted men were more negative about the military organization than their civilian peers. All in all, we conclude that the evidence for military distinctiveness in beliefs (in terms of measures of central tendency) is convincing--but only for career men.

Third, we examined measures of dispersion in responses in order to assess the level of consensus or homogeneity among military men and civilians on the various issues measured. As with the second approach to the data, career men showed a distinctiveness that was not found among non-career men. Career men displayed more homogeneity than their civilian counterparts, with career officers showing the highest level of homogeneity. We found no evidence (in Blair, 1975) that this greater homogeneity among career men is a function of age, and no clear evidence that the differences between officers and enlisted men are a function of education.

In summary, there is considerable evidence that the belief system of career military men--officers and enlisted--is distinctive from that found among comparable civilian groups. Career men were considerably more pro-military substantively and showed greater homogeneity or consensus in these beliefs. The same is not true for non-career men, who did not show any consistent pattern of distinctiveness.

One of the arguments raised in the debate about the all-volunteer force was the danger of a "separate military ethos" or distinctive "military mind" brought about by a military force made up largely of career men. The findings presented above suggest some basis for concern in this area. To the extent that new recruits into an all-volunteer force consist increasingly of the sort of career-oriented personnel we have been studying here, it seems inevitable that the military will indeed grow more separate from civilians--at least when it comes to views about the military and its mission.

In thinking about this problem of ideological representativeness, one can pose two "ideal" or "pure types" of military forces; the "citizen force" and the "career force." These types can be seen as the two ends of a continuum. In other words, the opposite of a "career force" made up primarily of career-oriented personnel would be a "citizen force" made up very largely of "citizen soldiers" (or sailors, etc.) who view their tour of military duty as a temporary activity--a part of their citizenship.

Neither type has existed in pure form in the United States. There has always been a career component of "professionals" in a primary citizen force and a citizen component of "in-and-outers" in a primarily "career force." In particular, it would not be accurate to describe the U.S. military of the recent past as a citizen force. Rather, it was what the President's Commission termed a "mixed force," consisting of some conscripts, some draft-motivated enlistees, and a goodly number of so-called "true volunteer."

But what kind of force are we going to have now that there is no conscription to guarantee a large citizen component? In other words, where will the All-Volunteer Force lie on the continuum? To the extent that an all-volunteer force comes to consist primarily of career-oriented men (and women) -- and thus approximates in reality our "career force" -- the attitudes found among its members as a whole will be very discrepant from those found among civilians as a whole. If this is the future of the All-volunteer Force, it will be considerably less representative in this respect than was the mixed force of the past.

Footnotes

[1]Since only a small proportion of career men are over 45 years of age, one could well question our leaving in civilians over 45. Given that older civilians are, if anything, somewhat more pro-military, we felt that it made the crucial career men versus civilian comparisons even more conservative, i.e., more difficult to show differences, and was justifiable for comparisons of mean scores. However, the wider age gap could affect the standard deviations by artifically inflating those of the civilian groups used in comparisons later in the chapter. A separate examination of this issue showed that there were greater discrepancies in standard deviations by sex than by age, i.e., the overall standard deviation for a given group was more affected by whether both men and women were included than by whether more or less inclusive age groups were included. Thus, we proceeded in the fashion described in the text to maintain as many cases as possible--especially among the college graduates.

[2]Generally, a difference between career enlisted men (Army or Navy) and their civilian comparison group of more than .09 or .15 standard deviation is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ or $p < .001$ level (two-tailed) respectively. The comparable figures for non-career EM/civilian differences are .15 and .25. See Bachman (1974:27) for a discussion of significance testing with these samples.

[3]Generally, a difference between career officers (Army or Navy) and their civilian comparison group of more than .19 or .32 standard deviation is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ or $p < .001$ level (two-tailed) respectively. The comparable figures for non-career officer/civilian differences are .34 and .58 for the Army and .28 and .47 for the Navy (which reflects the small sizes of the officer and civilian samples for these groups).

CHAPTER 5
VIEWS ON MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN INFLUENCE

Who should have more influence in major decisions involving the military and national security--civilian leaders or military leaders? This issue lies at the heart of much of the concern over the nature and potential impact of the "military mind." Among the variables treated in the preceding chapters are three composite measures dealing with military versus civilian influence--perceived military influence, preferred military influence, and adequacy of military influence (the gap between perception and preference). In the present chapter we "take apart" these composite measures of civil-military influence and examine the specific items on which they are based.

The questionnaire segment dealing with influence exercised by military and civilian leaders is reproduced in Table 5.1. Respondents were asked to rate amounts of military versus civilian influence in each of five areas: U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts, battlefield tactics, choice of new weapon systems, military pay levels, and use of nuclear weapons. For each area, respondents gave two ratings: a <u>perception</u> of present conditions ("This is how I think it is now"), and a <u>preference</u> ("This is how I'd like it to be").

Civilian Perceptions and Preferences

Civilian responses to these questionnaire items are summarized in Figure 5.1. (The actual mean scores are presented in Table D5.1 of Appendix D). On the average, the civilians showed a great deal of satisfaction with the status quo as they perceived it. Their mean ratings of perceived and preferred influence were

TABLE 5.1
Questionnaire Items Rating Military Versus Civilian Influence

The next questions ask your opinion about the influence that military leaders and civilian leaders (such as the President or Congress) have over certain decisions affecting national security.

	Civilians much more	Civilians somewhat more	About equal influence	Military somewhat more	Military much more
Who has most influence over whether to involve U.S. servicemen in foreign conflicts?					
This is how I think it is now:	1	2	3	4	5
This is how I'd like it to be:	1	2	3	4	5
Who has most influence over what tactics to use on the battlefield?					
This is how I think it is now:	1	2	3	4	5
This is how I'd like it to be:	1	2	3	4	5
Who has most influence over which new weapon systems to develop?					
This is how I think it is now:	1	2	3	4	5
This is how I'd like it to be:	1	2	3	4	5
Who has most influence over levels of pay and fringe benefits in the armed services?					
This is how I think it is now:	1	2	3	4	5
This is how I'd like it to be:	1	2	3	4	5
Who has most influence over whether to use nuclear weapons?					
This is how I think it is now:	1	2	3	4	5
This is how I'd like it to be:	1	2	3	4	5

FIGURE 5.1

Civilian Views on Military Versus Civilian Influence



NOTE: The data used to construct this figure are presented in Table D5.1 in Appendix D.

virtually identical. They rated military leaders as having somewhat more influence over tactics than civilians, and considered that the way things ought to be. They also tended to see military leaders as a bit more influential than civilians in deciding which new weapon systems to develop, and they preferred it that way. In such other matters as military pay, foreign involvements, and the use of nuclear weapons, the average respondent rated military and civilian leaders as about equal in influence; and apparently this is also what the average respondent preferred.

The tendency for civilians to be satisfied with the status quo is consistent with the finding, noted in Chapter 2, that over half the people in a recent national sample said the level of military influence in society should be "the same as now," with the rest of the sample split just about evenly between those who preferred more military influence and those who preferred less. Nevertheless, it is startling to find that civilians in 1972-73 were so willing to see military and civilian leaders as having equal influence over the involvement of troops in foreign conflicts or the use of nuclear weapons, since by law these are clearly areas of civilian control.

Of course, the civilian satisfaction with the status quo applies only on the average. Some respondents perceived military influence to be higher than the level they would prefer, and a roughly equal number took the opposite view. We noted in Chapter 2 that views about military versus civilian influence were related to the respondents' past military experience; veterans perceived actual levels of military influence to be somewhat lower than did non-veterans. Other differences in viewpoints were related to age and education. Younger respondents perceived higher levels of military influence than did older ones, on the average. And those with higher levels of education were more likely to prefer rather low levels of military influence.

The age and education differences noted above show up fairly consistently across all five of the areas of influence treated in the questionnaire. Figure 5.2 presents the data for the two "extreme" age and education subgroups--younger (age 34 or less) college graduates and older non-graduates. (The results for the other two age/education subgroups lie pretty much between these two groups; mean scores for all four groups are presented in Table D5.1 of Appendix D.) When we look at the scores for the younger college graduates, we see that on every dimension except military pay, the preferred level of military influence was lower than the level actually perceived to exist. Among older non-graduates just the opposite pattern appeared, although the discrepancies were not as large.

Another observation based on Figure 5.2 is perhaps more subtle, but worth noting; the younger college graduates were relatively discriminating in their ratings of the five different areas of influence--i.e., there was a fairly substantial gap between their preferences about battlefield tactics and their preferences about foreign involvements and nuclear weapons. The older graduates had almost identical preferences (although their perceptions of actual military influence were a bit lower). The non-college graduates, both younger and older, apparently were less discriminating in their preferences for the different influence areas.

Perceptions and Preferences of Military Men

We turn now to the perceptions and preferences of military men along the same dimensions we have been discussing for civilians. We will continue to distinguish between four categories of military men:

Non-Career Oriented Enlisted Men	Career-Oriented Enlisted Men
Non-Career-Oriented Officers	Career-Oriented Officers

FIGURE 5.2

Civilian Subgroup Views on Military Versus Civilian Influence



NOTE: The data used to construct this figure are presented in Table D5.1 in Appendix D.

And, of course, we will continue to present data from both the 1972-73 Navy sample and the 1974-75 Army sample. The mean questionnaire responses for these various groups of military men are displayed in the four parts of Figure 5.3 and also in Tables D5.2 and D5.3 of Appendix D. An examination of this figure leads to a number of comments and conclusions:

1. The perceived and preferred influence ratings are in much the same order for each set of military respondents. Moreover, the ordering is similar to that found for civilians in Figure 5.1. (The sequence in which the items are presented in all of the figures reflects this ordering; it is not the sequence in which the questions were asked.) All military and civilian subgroups rated battlefield tactics as the area of greatest military influence (among those listed), while the areas of greatest civilian influence were seen to be decisions about foreign involvements and the use of nuclear weapons.

The area of pay levels and fringe benefits in the armed services deserves special mention. Among all four categories of career and non-career officers and enlisted men, this was the area of the greatest dissatisfaction with the status quo--i.e., the greatest discrepancy between ratings of the way things are and the way they ought to be. Military men, on the average, perceived this as an area of somewhat greater civilian influence, whereas they preferred that the greater amount of influence be exercised by military leaders. (Civilians, on the other hand, both perceived and preferred about equal civilian and military influence over military pay and fringe benefits.)

2. Military officers, both career and non-career, tended to make much sharper discriminations among the various areas of influence than did the enlisted men. This tendency showed up to some extent in their ratings of the way things actually are, but was especially strong in their

FIGURE 5.3

Military Subgroup Views on Military Versus Civilian Influence



FIGURE 5.3 (continued)

Military Subgroup Views on Military Versus Civilian Influence



NOTE: The data used to construct this figure are presented in Tables D5.2 and D5.3 in Appendix D.

statements about the way they preferred things to be. On the one hand, they thought there should be a good deal more military than civilian influence over choice of battlefield tactics; however, their responses here were not sharply different from the preferences expressed by enlisted men or, for that matter, by civilians. On the other hand, when it came to foreign involvements and the use of nuclear weapons, the officers, like the civilian college graduates, preferred more emphasis on civilian decision-making. (There are some distinctions to be made between Army and Navy officers, and those who did and did not have military career plans; we will turn to such distinctions a bit later.)

No doubt officers have had occasion to give these matters much more thought and study than either enlisted men or the average civilian. The result is that officers were more discriminating in their ratings and far more willing to grant decision-making priorities to civilians in the areas that are traditionally "civilian." Lest we conclude, however, that military officers are unique in this respect, we should recall that civilian college graduates were equal to officers in their preferences for greater civilian than military control over foreign involvements and nuclear weapons. Indeed, if we concentrate on <u>discrepancies</u> between ratings of "how I think it is now" and "how I'd like it to be," we see that civilian college graduates preferred a reduction in military influence in these areas whereas most officers preferred an increase.

3. If we view discrepancies between the perception and preference ratings as a reflection of dissatisfaction with the status quo, the career enlisted men were by far the most dissatisfied group of respondents we have examined. They preferred a good deal of military influence over all areas, even (in the case of the Army career enlisted men) extending to predominantly military influence over foreign involvements and decisions about the use of nuclear weapons.

Career officers, while more discriminating in their influence ratings, ran a close second to career enlisted men in their discrepancies

between perceptions of "how it is now" and their preferences for how they would "like it to be." Both categories of career men are especially noteworthy in terms of their perceptions of actual levels of military versus civilian influence. Career military men, both officers and enlisted men, Army and Navy, tended to see military leaders as much less influential than civilian leaders. This is somewhat different from the perceptions of non-career military men, and it stands in sharp contrast to the perceptions of the civilian respondents.

One way of viewing the discrepancies between perceptions and preferences is to say that career men in the military tend to feel relatively powerless as a group over decisions that vitally affect their lives. They see decisions as being made mostly by civilians rather than by their own leaders. But why is it that career-oriented servicemen rated actual levels of military influence so much lower than did non-career enlisted men and especially civilians? Is it because the relatively inexperienced non-career enlisted men, and also the civilian respondents, are simply unrealistic about the actual levels of military versus civilian influence? Or does it mean that the career men are overly frustrated about what they perceive to be inadequate levels of military influence? To put the matter another way, should we conceive of the ratings of actual influence as more-or-less dispassionate reports of the way things are, or should we view them primarily as attitudinal measures--indicators of dissatisfaction and a sense of relative powerlessness among some military men? These questions are not purely speculative; earlier analyses of some of these data (Bachman, 1973, 1974) have indicated that the measures of perceived military influence "act like" other more clearly attitudinal dimensions--they appear to be a part of the overall pattern of pro- or anti-military sentiment discussed in earlier chapters. Thus we conclude that the military men's ratings of actual influence levels are, at least in part, an indirect indication of dissatisfaction with the status quo.

In sum, it seems that career officers and enlisted men thought there should be a substantial increase in military influence all across the range of decision-making from battlefield tactics to the use of

military weapons. Some critics have argued that an all-volunteer military force will involve a heavier reliance on career men, thereby encouraging a "separate military ethos" which will constitute a political threat. This desire on the part of career men for increased military influence over national decision-making can hardly be reassuring to such critics.

4. We turn now to a comparison of influence ratings by Navy men in 1972-73 and those by Army men in 1974-75. Here, as we noted for the broader range of measures discussed in Chapter 3, we find that the similarities between the two samples far outweigh the differences. For three of the four subgroups, the Army responses are very close to the ones obtained two years earlier from the Navy sample. The largest discrepancies appeared again between Army and Navy non-career officers, and these differences were larger for preferences about influence than for perceptions of actual influence levels. Army non-career officers preferred somewhat higher levels of military influence than did their Navy counterparts.

The other three subgroups also showed some tendency for Army men to prefer a bit higher levels of military influence than did Navy men. These differences showed up most clearly in the area of foreign involvements and especially in decisions about the use of nuclear weapons. Whether this reflects some difference between the two service branches, or a more general shift in the thinking of military men during the two year interval between the Navy and Army data collections, cannot be known from these data alone.

Summary and Conclusions

Civilians in 1973, taken as a whole, demonstrated a good deal of satisfaction with the balance of military versus civilian influence, as they perceived that balance to exist. When the civilian respondents are separated according to age and education, some differences emerge: those with higher levels of education preferred somewhat less in the way of military influence, and the younger respondents were more apt to see the actual levels of

military influence as rather high. Thus it follows that the younger college-educated respondents preferred less military influence than they perceived to be the current situation, whereas the opposite was true for older respondents who were not college-educated.

Non-career enlisted men in both Army and Navy samples showed a pattern of perceptions and preferences fairly similar to the pattern for the total civilian sample. Some gap appeared between perceptions and preferences, with the non-career servicemen preferring a bit more military influence than they perceived to be the case; nevertheless, the discrepancy was not very large. The non-career officers in the 1972-73 Navy sample also showed a tendency to prefer moderately more military influence than they thought presently existed. On the other hand, among the Army non-career officers surveyed in 1974-75 the gap between perception and preference was appreciably larger.

But the largest and most consistent discrepancies between perceptions and preferences about military influence were found among those officers and enlisted men who had career interests in the military. Although the career-oriented officers were more discriminating in their ratings of the different areas than were the career-oriented enlisted men, both groups perceived actual levels of military influence as being quite low and preferred that they be much higher.

It is worth noting that the responses of career-oriented military men are in several respects quite unusual for survey data of this sort. A number of their mean scores were extremely close to one end or the other of the five-point response scale--something which did not appear among non-career or civilian groups. Moreover, the mean discrepancies between perceptions and preferences were almost all strikingly large. In short, the career military men were telling us--louder and clearer than we were accustomed to hearing--that they were dissatisfied with present levels of military influence and preferred a good deal more.

The data presented in this chapter are relatively simple, descriptive survey findings. They also represent some of the most dramatic and, in many respects, the most disconcerting findings in this report. It is hard to know which set of responses is more troublesome. (1) A cross-section of civilians both perceived and preferred that military leaders be equal to civilian leaders in decisions about foreign conflicts and the use of nuclear weapons, and that the military leaders be more influential than civilians in other areas. (2) Samples of career men in the Army and the Navy perceived actual levels of military influence to be inadequate and desired a great deal more. Both findings remind us of the dangers of a separate military ethos. In our view, they also underline the need for policies that will encourage a substantial number of citizen soldiers and sailors--non-career military personnel--as a vital ingredient in the all-volunteer force.

APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTION OF NAVY, CIVILIAN, AND ARMY SAMPLES*

Navy Sample

Data from the Navy sample were collected from both ship and shore stations between November 1972 and February 1973. The questionnaires were personally administered by the Institute for Social Research personnel.

Ships were included from both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Individuals in the sample were chosen in proportion to the number of personnel assigned to each ship type. For example, if 35 percent of the personnel assigned to ships were aboard destroyers, 35 percent of the individuals in the sample were selected so as to come from destroyers. Ships themselves were chosen largely on the basis of availability, with the specific ship selection occasionally influenced by the logistics of moving Organizational Research Program staff from one ship to another. As may be imagined, weather was also an occasional element in determining whether the necessary connections between two selected ships could be made.

For at least two reasons, an effort was made to maximize in the sample as many ships as possible currently deployed away from their home ports. First, larger proportions of the billets are in fact filled on deployed ships than on ships in ports. Second, per-

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* A detailed description of sampling techniques as well as a description of the fit of the Navy and Civilian samples to their respective populations has been provided by Michaelsen (1973). A detailed description of the Army sample has been provided by Spencer (1975). The present descriptions have been excerpted from the Michaelsen and Spencer papers.

sonnel aboard deployed ships are more likely to have had a period of exposure to the organizational variables being measured. For these reasons, more than half of the ships sampled were deployed at the time of the administration of the survey.

Shore stations were included from eight shore station commands (Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Training, Material, Personnel, Medicine and Surgery, Security, and Communications) and from the CNO staff. Individuals in the sample were chosen in proportion to the number of personnel assigned to each command. Specific shore stations were randomly selected from those available in four geographical areas--East Coast, Memphis-Pensacola, San Diego, and Hawaii.

Personnel actually surveyed aboard a particular site were members of intact organizational subunits, consisting of work groups related to one another through supervisors who are, at the same time, a superior of the group they supervise and a subordinate in the group immediately above. In this fashion, one may conceive of the organization as a structure of such overlapping groups, a pyramid of interlaced pyramids. For purposes of identifying and selecting intact units for the study's analytic aims, the sampling basis was designated as a "module," by which is meant a "pyramid" of groups three echelons tall. Thus, members from four adjacent levels were included, with the module head defined as the person at the apex of that particular three-tier pyramid. Yet another criterion for the selection of a module was that the person at the apex (the module head) had been at his current assignment for at least three months.

A list of all personnel at a site who met the criteria for module head was obtained from manpower authorization documents and from organizational charts, and from these rosters an appropriate number of module heads were randomly selected. If a particular module did not provide a large enough sample of personnel required for the particular site, another module head was selected by the same method. Thus, the sample from a site consisted of one or

more modules.

This sampling procedure resulted in data collection from 38 different Navy sites in a total sample size of 2522 Navy personnel.

Civilian Sample

The civilian data collection was conducted during February and March of 1973, as part of a larger interview study conducted by the Survey Research Center. The sample included 1327 dwelling units, selected by a multistage sampling system so as to be representative of all dwellings in the conterminous United States exclusive of those on military reservations.

At each housing unit, a trained interviewer from the Survey Research Center conducted an interview with a specifically designated respondent, male or female, age 18 or older. The final segment of the interview consisted of questions related to the all-volunteer force. Following this personal interview, respondents were asked to complete the pencil-and-paper questionnaire. In addition, copies of the questionnaire were administered to a supplementary sample consisting of all other individuals age 16 or older who were present in each household at the time an interview was taken. Interviewers waited until all questionnaires in a household were completed; none were left behind.

The 1327 interviews obtained represent a response rate of 75 percent. About 90 percent of those interviewed also filled out questionnaires. These, plus the supplementary sample (those who were not interviewed but did complete questionnaires), provided a total of about 1855 civilian questionnaires.

An examination of the interview sample and the supplementary sample, reported by Michaelsen (1973), showed no systematic differences between the two, except for the fact that the supplementary sample included individuals aged 16 and 17. Because of several advantages from a statistical standpoint, we have chosen to

treat the civilian interview and supplementary samples as a single unweighted sample of people age 16 or older throughout the United States.

Army Sample

A sample of 2286 Army officers and enlisted personnel was drawn from a broad cross-section of units. The questionnaires were personally administered by Institute for Social Research personnel during a five month period between November 1974 and April 1975.

Information necessary for sampling was gathered in the form of data printouts which described the active Army in terms of command structure, geographic location, size, function, and mission. The research plan required data from intact organizational units; therefore, it was necessary to identify organizational groupings which potentially included any individual in the Army. Since companies or battalions would not incorporate all Army personnel, Parent Unit was designated as the primary grouping for sampling purposes.

Once all Parent Units in the Army were listed, a total number could be obtained, a sampling frame determined, and every "Nth" Parent Unit selected for inclusion in the sample. However, it was felt that representativeness could be enhanced by some meaningful form of stratification. After much exploration and many trials, two strata were selected as appropriate and useful: geographical location and functional designation (UNCLAC) of each Parent Unit.

The study called for an Army sample of about 2500 respondents. selected in such fashion as to include organizational units at least three hierarchical levels tall. These requirements suggested a "module" (intact hierarchical set of groups) size of approximately 50 respondents, and approximately 50 modules.

To select the 50 modules, two separate computer print-outs

were obtained containing all Parent Units in the Army. One printout listed unit by geographical location, while the second listed them by functional designation or UNCLAC code. Based upon the subtotals for major classifications within each of these printouts, the number of modules that should be drawn from each of the major strata became evident. Since the size of the project's resources placed restrictions on the extent of data collection that was feasible, it was decided to restrict the geographic areas in which data collection would occur. The requested and obtained numbers of modules indicate that geographical representation was obtained:

Area	No. Modules Requested	No. Modules Obtained	Percent Obtained
Germany	15	12	80
Hawaii-Korea-Alaska	7	5	71
1st Army	10	7	70
5th Army	10	7	70
6th Army	6	6	100
Military District of Washington	2	0	0
TOTAL	50	37	76

A next step in selecting the sample was to obtain a list of Parent Units by INCLAC, constrained on the above geographic locations. Finally there was needed some consideration for the size of the Parent Unit. The resulting sample would not be representative of the Army if large units and small units had an equal chance of being selected. Therefore, a weighting scheme was applied to all listed Parent Units, based upon the number of personnel in the unit. The weighting scheme was:

Number of Army Personnel in Parent Unit	Weight
0-49	0
50-149	1
150-249	2
250-349	3
350-449	4
450-549	5
etc.	etc.

The number of modules to be selected from a given UNCLAC

classification was divided into the total number of Parent Unit weighting numbers. The result represented the sampling number to be used in conjunction with a random numbers table. For example, if a module was to be selected from a classification whose total weighting numbers added to 67, then a random numbers table would be used containing numbers from 1 to 67 and some predetermined one would be selected (the first number). If the first number were to be used, and it happened to be 16, then the Parent Units would be counted from the first to the sixteenth (according to the appropriate weighting numbers). The sixteenth Parent Unit would be selected for the sample.

Finally, the two stratifications -- geographic and functional -- were integrated. This was accomplished by creating a table with the geographic areas to be included and spaces for the number of units required for each. As Parent Units were selected, the table was completed.

APPENDIX B

INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG MILITARY VALUES, PREFERENCES AND PERCEPTIONS

In this appendix, we presented some prior work (Bachman, 1974) which discusses the process of data reduction completed using the Navy and civilian samples. In addition, the appendix provides the details of the interpretation of the factor analysis and of the various measures. The last part of this appendix gives the specifics on how the measures were constructed and which items were used.

The Measures of Values, Preferences and Perceptions

The questionnaire segment dealing with military values, preferences and perceptions (Section C) includes 57 items, designed to measure a considerable number of different, but interrelated, concepts. An important phase of our analysis involved the consolidation of these items into a smaller number of indexes. This data reduction effort served two purposes: first, it produced multi-item variables, which are generally more stable and reliable than single items; second, it reduced the complexity of the material to a more manageable level. A number of indexes had been constructed on an *a priori* basis; and some of these were presented in the first technical report (Bachman, 1973). Other indexes were planned, contingent upon finding that the items were satisfactorily intercorrelated. A few others were not anticipated in advance, but were developed out of our analysis of the intercorrelations among items.

An early stage in our efforts toward data reduction involved a number of factor analyses including nearly all of the items in Section

C of the questionnaire. These analyses confirmed most of our prior expectations about sets of variables to be combined into indexes; in a few other cases the analyses enabled us to locate items which did not meet our expectations.

It is not necessary for our present purposes to report the details of the preliminary analyses which led to further data reduction. It is worth noting, however, that these analyses were conducted separately for civilians, the Navy sample taken as a whole, and the three sub-groups within the Navy sample (officers, first-term enlisted men, later term enlisted men). The patterns of factors which emerged from these several groups were quite similar; thus we felt confident that the indexes we were developing were applicable across all the groups examined in this report.

Table B-1 summarizes the measures of values, preferences and perceptions concerning military service which resulted from our data reduction efforts. As a matter of convenience, the measures are organized in the table according to the conceptual categories followed in our preceding report (Bachman, 1973). A more detailed description of the measures, including a listing of items and rules for index construction, may be found later in this appendix . Additional descriptive information concerning many of the items is contained in the preceding report. The reader is urged to refer to these sources for a clearer understanding of what the measures contain.

Most of the measures shown in Table B-1 are indexes based on two or more items. Three one-item measures are included because they are conceptually important but do not lend themselves to combination into indexes. Of the 57 items in Section C of our basic instrument, 42 are included in the 17 measures shown in Table B-1 [1].

A word is in order concerning the names given to the measures in Table B-1 . An effort was made to capture the essence of an item or index in relatively few words, while at the same time conveying a good deal of the meaning. Some of the measures were better suited to this effort than others; in a few cases the names may seem a bit strained. In all cases, the name corresponds to a high score on the measure.[2]

TABLE B-1

Summary of Military Value, Preference and Perception Measures

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE

- Perceived Military Job Opportunities
- Perceived Fair Treatment in Services
- Perceived Discrimination Against Women and Blacks

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

- Perceived Competence of Military Leaders

MILITARY INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY

- Preference for Higher Military Spending and Influence
- *Role of Military in Society Perceived as Negative
- Perceived Military (Versus Civilian) Influence
- Preferred Military (Versus Civilian) Influence
- Adequacy of Military Influence (Perceived Minus Preferred)

FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER

- Support for Military Intervention
- Preference for U.S. Military Supremacy
- Vietnam Dissent

ISSUES INVOLVED IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

- Support for Amnesty
- *Opposition to Unquestioning Military Obedience
- *Opposition to Obedience in My Lai-type Incident
- Preference for "Citizen Soldiers" (Versus "Career Men")
- Preference for Wide Range of Political Views Among Servicemen

NOTES: Measures marked with an asterisk (*) are single items. All others are indexes based on two or more items. A complete listing of items included in each measure appears later in this appendix .

A General Factor of Pro-Military Sentiment

Our earlier explorations of the data, and some examination of the correlation matrices described above, led us to feel that there is a "general factor" of pro-military (or anti-military) sentiment underlying most of the measures we have been discussing. In an effort to test this notion we performed a set of factor analyses.

As a first step, product-moment correlations were computed among all of the measures in Table B-1 . The correlations were computed for each of the following analysis groups separately:

Navy First-term enlisted men
Navy later-term enlisted men
Navy officers
Civilian men
Civilian women

The complete correlation matrices are presented in Appendix B (of Bachman, 1974). A bit later in the [appendix] we will comment on selected portions of the matrices, but first we turn to factor analyses based on them.

Our purpose in this series of factor analyses was not to find a number of separate orthogonal factors (since that had already been done in the earlier stages of analysis and index development). Rather, we were looking for the largest and most general single factor underlying the military value, preference and perception measures. Accordingly, we used the principal components method and focused attention on the first factor (unrotated). The factor loadings for each of the five analysis groups are displayed in Table B-2 .

The results shown in Table B-2 clearly confirm our view that there is a rather substantial general factor of "pro-military sentiment" which contributes to our measures of military views. It accounts for or "explains" between 23 percent and 30 percent of the variance in these measures for Navy enlisted men and civilians. (It accounts for 36 percent of the variance for Navy officers, and the factor loadings for this group tend to be somewhat higher than is true for other groups. We will shortly consider a likely explanation for this pattern of stronger intercorrelations for the officer group.)

TABLE B-2

Loadings on a General Factor of "Pro-Military Sentiment"

	Factor Loadings* For:					
	Navy Sample			Civilian Sample		
	1st-term Enl. Men	later-term Enl. Men	Officers	Men	Women	Civ. Male Coll Grads
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE (N):	(1194)	(834)	(310)	(753)	(1053)	(133)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	.6088	.5830	.7212	.4225	.4030	.5271
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	.5727	.5665	.6997	.5015	.4982	.5469
Perceived Discrimination Against Women and Blacks	-.2142	-.3715	-.4677	-.3996	-.3772	-.5856
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perceived Competence of Military Leaders	.6909	.6491	.7739	.6661	.6924	.7198
MILITARY INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY						
Preference for Higher Military Spending and Influence	.6542	.4486	.7707	.7270	.6951	.8466
Role of Military in Society Perceived as Negative	-.5786	-.3236	-.5351	-.5421	-.5778	-.6265
Adequacy of Military Influence (Perc. Minus Pref.)	-.5225	-.3295	-.6630	-.6274	-.5149	-.7402
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	.4572	.4945	.5689	.4127	.2626	.5772
Preference for U.S. Military Supremacy	.5810	.4368	.6479	.6032	.5886	.6387
Vietnam Dissent	-.7195	-.6928	-.7749	-.6919	-.6832	-.7468
ISSUES INVOLVED IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support for Amnesty	-.5855	-.6045	-.7273	-.6464	-.6067	-.7566
Opposition to Unquestioning Military Obedience	-.5508	-.5079	-.4293	-.5607	-.5710	-.5718
Opposition to Obedience in My Lai-type Incident	-.5232	-.3235	-.3289	-.5398	-.4823	-.6231
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers" (Vs. "Career Men")	-.0804	-.3197	-.4203	-.1301	-.1203	-.2379
Preference for Wide Range of Views Among Servicemen	-.0854	-.2852	-.3019	-.3515	-.2025	-.5133
Variance explained (by first factor)	28.4%	23.1%	36.1%	29.5%	26.5%	40.1%

* Table entries are loadings on the first factor (unrotated) resulting from factor analyses using the principal components method.

There is a considerable degree of similarity in the patterns of factor loadings for all five analysis groups. Without exception, the direction of loading is the same for all analysis groups--i.e., a measure is either positively loaded for all groups or negatively loaded for all. Moreover, those measures which load most strongly are the same across all groups.

Let us consider what it means to be high in our general factor of pro-military sentiment. Not surprisingly, those highest in pro-military sentiment rate our military leaders as quite competent, give the military services high marks for job opportunity and fair treatment, state a preference for higher levels of military spending and influence, and see the role of the military in society as predominantly positive. Their foreign policy views are rather "hawkish"--they are relatively supportive of U.S. military intervention in other countries, they prefer a position of military supremacy (rather than parity with the U.S.S.R.), they are most likely to support past U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and they are strongly opposed to amnesty for those who refused to serve in Vietnam. Finally, they place a high value on obedience to military authority--they tend to agree that "servicemen should obey orders without question" (question C53) and some maintain this position even when faced with a My Lai-type incident (question C54).

Among all the dimensions summarized above, the measure of Vietnam Dissent has a particularly strong loading on the general factor of military sentiment. One possible interpretation for this relationship is that those who are generally supportive of the military establishment have, as a result, been least critical of our past involvement in Vietnam. In other words, Vietnam views are shaped by broader attitudes about the military. An alternative interpretation is that views about the Vietnam involvement are generalized to the larger military establishment, so that negative feelings about Vietnam lead to negative views about military spending, influence, leadership, and the like. These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive--indeed, it is likely that both patterns of causation are at work. But it is surely worth emphasizing that, as of early 1973,

feelings about Vietnam were a very central ingredient in overall sentiment toward the military services.

The measures which show little association with the general factor of military sentiment are the dimensions most closely linked to the debate about the draft versus the all-volunteer force--Preference for Citizen Soldiers (Versus "Career Men") and Preference for Wide Range of Political Views Among Servicemen. These two dimensions seem to stand somewhat apart from most of the other measures and are less integrated into an overall pro-military or anti-military continuum. It is perhaps worth noting that the rather small loadings for these dimensions are in a negative direction, suggesting that those with the most favorable feelings toward the military services are a bit less likely to prefer "citizen soldiers" or a wide range of political views among servicemen. Nevertheless, our more basic conclusion is that our respondents show little "polarization" along these dimensions--perhaps indicating that most people have not given much thought to the issues they represent.

Up to this point we have been concentrating upon relationships which are consistent across the several Navy and civilian analysis groups. Now let us turn to some differences among groups that are of interest. We noted in our previous report that the measure of Military Job Opportunity is a stronger correlate of pro- or anti-enlistment views among Navy men than among civilians. In the present factor analyses we see a parallel tendency reflected in the higher factor loadings for Military Job Opportunity among each of the three Navy groups. A similar pattern, though not so strong, appears for the measure of Perceived Fair Treatment in the Services. It seems quite reasonable that military job opportunities and fair treatment would play a relatively large part in the overall military sentiment of those presently in the Navy; it is interesting also to note that the finding is fully as strong for officers as for enlisted men.

Another difference of interest is one mentioned earlier--the tendency for Navy officers to show generally stronger correlation than do the other Navy or civilian groups. These stronger correlations can be observed in Appendix B (in Bachman, 1974), and they are also

reflected in the factor analysis loadings and explained variance shown in Table B-2 . When we first became aware of this pattern of stronger relationships for Navy officers, we thought it might reflect their deep personal involvement and the fact that they, more than civilians or enlisted men, have thought about the issues treated here and tried to place them in a consistent perspective.

But it also occurred to us that consistency in questionnaire responses is sometimes related to intelligence or education. Since the great majority of Navy officers are college graduates, it seemed quite possible that the pattern of relatively stronger correlations among officers is simply due to their higher average level of education. This suspicion was confirmed when we compared Navy officers with the subgroup of civilian men who had completed college (N=133). The results of the factor analysis, shown in Table 3 (in Bachman, 1974) along with the results for Navy officers, show a striking similarity in overall strength of relationships. A few differences may be noted: factor loadings for Perceived Military Job Opportunities and Perceived Fair Treatment in Services remain higher for the Navy officers than for the civilian college graduates, whereas factor loadings for the obedience items are relatively higher for the civilian group. On the whole, however, the two groups show rather similar patterns of relationships, and this leads us to conclude that the high pattern of correlations among Navy officers is more a reflection of their education than their special interest in the topics covered.

Footnotes

[1] The 17 measures in Table B-1 contain one instance of redundancy. The indexes of Perceived Military Influence and Preferred Military Influence are ingredients for a single discrepancy measure (Perceived minus Preferred) which indicates the extent to which a respondent thinks the level of actual military influence exceeds, or falls short of, what he would consider ideal. In our factor analyses the separate Perceived and Preferred measures are excluded, thus leaving a set of 15 measures in which each item appears no more than once.

[2] This requirement that the name of a measure match a high score resulted in a few awkward or negative-sounding wordings. For example, Item C27 asks whether the role of the military services since World War II has been mostly positive or negative, but since a high score of "4" is attached to the strongly negative responses alternative it was necessary to label this measure: "Role of Military in Society Perceived as Negative." For the same reason it was necessary to label two measures as "Opposition to Obedience..." It would have been possible, of course, to reverse the coding of these items, but we felt that the resulting risk of error or confusion outweighted the awkwardness of a few negative-sounding names.

APPENDIX C

ITEM INGREDIENTS FOR MILITARY VALUE, PREFERENCE AND PERCEPTION MEASURES

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE

Perceived Military Job Opportunities

All items share the following introduction:
To what extent do you think the following opportunities are available to people who work in the military services: (1=very little extent; 5=very great extent)

C1. A chance to get ahead
C2. A chance to get more education
C3. A chance to advance to a more responsible position
C4. A chance to have a personally more fulfilling job
C5. A chance to get their ideas heard
(One item of missing data allowed in index construction.)

Perceived Fair Treatment in Services

C6. To what extent is it likely that a person in the military can get things changed and set right if he is being treated unjustly by a superior? (1=very little extent; 5=very great extent)

C9R. Do you personally feel that you would receive more just and fair treatment as a civilian or as a member of the military service? (Reversed: 1=much more fair as civilian; 5= much more fair in service; 6, "question not appropriate for me" treated as missing data)

Perceived Discrimination Against Women and Blacks

C7. To what extent do you think there is an discrimination against women who are in the armed services? (1=very little extent; 5=very great extent)

C8. To what extent do you think there is any discrimination against black people who are in the armed services? (1=very little extent; 5=very great extent)

NOTES: This table displays each major measure (underlined) along with its item(s) listed by question number. The response scale for each item is indicated by its end points, and the scoring shown is that used to construct the measure. Those items marked with an "R" had to be recoded in reverse for index purposes; in such cases the response scale shown in this table is the recoded (reversed) version. Unless otherwise indicated, indexes are means of the items shown, with no missing data allowed.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Perceived Competence of Military Leaders

C19. To what extent do you think our military leaders are smart people who know what they are doing? (1=very little extent; 5=very great extent)

C24. To what extent do you think you can trust our military leadership to do what is right? (1=very little extent; 5=very great extent)

MILITARY INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY

Preference for Higher Military Spending and Influence

C25. All things considered, do you think the armed services presently have too much or too little influence on the way this country is run? (1=far too much; 5=far too little)

C26. Do you think the U.S. spends too much or too little on the armed services? (1=far too much; 5=far too little)

Role of Military in Society Perceived as Negative

C27. Overall, how do you feel about the role of the military services in our society during the time since World War II--has it been mostly positive or mostly negative? (1=strongly positive; 4=strongly negative)

Perceived Military (Versus Civilian) Influence

C28. Who has most influence over whether to involve U.S. servicemen in foreign conflicts? (see note below)

C30. Who has most influence over what tactics to use on the battlefield?

C32. Who has most influence over which new weapon systems to develop?

C34. Who has most influence over levels of pay and fringe benefits in the armed services?

C36. Who has most influence over whether to use nuclear weapons?

Each question above is followed by the statement; This is how I think it is now: (1=civilians much more; 5=military much more)
(One item of missing data allowed in index construction.)

Preferred Military (Versus Civilian) Influence

C29, C31, C33, C35, C37
The questions are the same as C28 through C36 above, with each question followed by the statement: This is how I'd like it to be: (1=civilians much more; 5=military much more)
(One item of missing data allowed in index construction.)

Adequacy of Military Influence (Perceived Minus Preferred)

This measure consists of the discrepancy or difference between the two indexes above. Specifically, the measure is computed as follows:

$$\text{Adequacy of Military Influence} = \left[\text{Perceived Influence}\right] - \left[\text{Preferred Influence}\right] + 4$$

The constant 4 is added to avoid negative numbers. A score on this measure larger than 4 indicates that perceived military influence is greater (more "adequate") than the respondent would prefer; a score lower than 4 indicates the reverse--military influence less adequate than the respondent would prefer.

FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER

Support for Military Intervention

C39R. There may be times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries. (Reversed: 1=disagree; 4=agree)

C41. The only good reason for the U.S. to go to war is to defend against an attack on our own country. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

Preference for U.S. Military Supremacy

C42. The U.S. does not need to have greater military power than the Soviet Union. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

C43R. The U.S. ought to have much more military power than any other nation in the world. (1=disagree; 4=agree)

Vietnam Dissent

C45R. Fighting the war in Vietnam has been damaging to our national honor or pride. (Reversed: 1=disagree; 4=agree)

C46R. Fighting the war in Vietnam has not really been in the national interest. (Reversed: 1=disagree; 4=agree)

C47. Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to fight the spread of Communism. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

C48R. Fighting the war in Vietnam has brought us closer to world war. (Reversed 1=disagree; 4=agree)

C49. Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to protect friendly countries. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

C50. Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to show other nations that we keep our promises. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

(One item of missing data allowed in index construction.)

ISSUES INVOLVED IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Support for Amnesty

C51. Going to Canada to avoid fighting in Vietnam was wrong, and those who did so should be punished. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

C52R. The men who went to Canada rather than fight in Vietnam were doing what they felt was right. They should be allowed to return to the U.S. without being punished. (Reversed: 1=disagree; 4=agree)

Opposition to Unquestioning Military Obedience

C53. Servicement should obey orders without question. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

Opposition to Obedience in My Lai-type Incident

C54. Suppose a groups of soldiers in Vietnam were ordered by their superior officers to shoot all inhabitants of a village suspected of aiding the enemy including old men, women and children? In your opinion, what should the soldiers do in such a situation? (1=follow orders and shoot; 2=don't know; 3=refuse to shoot them)

Preference for "Citizen Soldiers" (Versus "Career Men")

C12R. Most of our servicemen should be "citizen soldiers"---men who spend just three or four years in the military and then return to civilian life. (Reversed: 1=disagree; 4=agree)

C13. Our military service should be staffed mostly with "career men" who spend twenty or more years in the service. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

Preference for Wide Range of Political Views Among Servicemen

C14. Only those who agree with our military policy should be allowed to serve in the armed forces. (1=agree; 4=disagree)

C15R. There ought to be a wide range of different political viewpoints among those in the military service. (Reversed: 1=disagree; 4=agree)

APPENDIX D

SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

TABLE D2.1

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for All Civilians

	Mean Scores	Standard Deviations
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE		
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.40	.89
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.47	.87
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.52	1.03
MILITARY LEADERSHIP		
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3.39	.92
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY		
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.60	.89
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.28	.67
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.20	1.06
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.18	.83
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	4.02	1.30
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER		
Support for Military Intervention	2.24	.79
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.85	.88
Vietnam Dissent	2.46	.72
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE		
Support for Amnesty	2.05	1.09
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.20	.97
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.17	.74
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.59	.85
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.78	.81

TABLE D2.2

Substantive Midpoints and Deviations from Midpoints for All Civilians

	Midpoints	Deviations
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE		
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3	+.45
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	3	-.61
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	3	+.47
MILITARY LEADERSHIP		
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3	+.42
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY		
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	3	-.45
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.5	+.33
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3	-.19
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3	+.22
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	4	-.02
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER		
Support for Military Intervention	2.5	-.33
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.5	+.40
Vietnam Dissent	2.5	+.06
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE		
Support for Amnesty	2.5	+.41
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.5	+.31
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2	-.23
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.5	-.11
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.5	-.35

TABLE D2.3

Mean Scores for Civilian Racial Groups

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE (N):	White (1536)	Black (150)	Other (46)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.38	3.58	3.27
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.45	2.65	2.53
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.44	3.20	2.75
MILITARY LEADERSHIP			
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3.42	3.14	3.03
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY			
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.61	2.46	2.39
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.27	2.39	2.41
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.19	3.29	3.21
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.17	3.25	3.14
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	4.02	4.05	4.07
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER			
Support for Military Intervention	2.20	2.23	2.32
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.86	2.92	2.54
Vietnam Dissent	2.44	2.65	2.55
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE			
Support for Amnesty	1.97	2.76	2.41
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.18	2.31	2.34
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.18	2.09	2.23
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.56	2.75	2.80
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.79	2.64	2.67

TABLE D2.4

Mean scores for Civilian Region of Origin Groups

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE (N):	New Eng. (102)	East (399)	South (406)	Midwest (496)	West (206)	Other (113)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.26	3.39	3.48	3.34	3.29	3.58
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.43	2.47	2.58	2.41	2.30	2.66
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.68	2.51	2.51	2.44	2.67	2.57
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3.15	3.46	3.43	3.37	3.28	3.59
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY						
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.23	2.61	2.77	2.51	2.57	2.63
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.40	2.19	2.33	2.28	2.36	2.17
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.31	3.08	3.20	3.22	3.23	3.36
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.07	3.13	3.36	3.11	3.04	3.37
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	4.26	3.94	3.84	4.10	4.19	3.98
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	1.99	2.17	2.35	2.28	2.24	2.18
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.60	2.89	3.05	2.77	2.65	2.98
Vietnam Dissent	2.66	2.41	2.40	2.47	2.57	2.39
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support for Amnesty	2.15	1.97	2.09	1.99	2.21	2.02
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.33	2.18	2.21	2.17	2.33	1.94
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.24	2.19	2.08	2.20	2.24	2.14
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.49	2.63	2.53	2.58	2.69	2.51
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.84	2.82	2.67	2.78	2.82	2.87

TABLE D2.5

Mean Scores for Civilian Groups by Age and Education

	Younger		Older		
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Coll Grads	Non-Grads	Coll Grads	Non-Grads	Eta (adj.)
(N):	(116)	(645)	(128)	(836)	
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.02	3.39	3.20	3.47	.180
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.01	2.48	2.25	2.57	.132
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.94	2.54	2.65	2.42	.122
MILITARY LEADERSHIP					
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	2.95	3.27	3.35	3.59	.189
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY					
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.03	2.60	2.39	2.71	.166
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.55	2.32	2.34	2.20	.130
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.34	3.37	2.95	3.08	.138
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.83	3.12	2.83	3.34	.201
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	4.51	4.25	4.12	3.74	.201
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER					
Support for Military Intervention	2.24	2.29	2.30	2.20	.025
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.29	2.76	2.58	3.04	.244
Vietnam Dissent	2.85	2.49	2.55	2.36	.166
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE					
Support for Amnesty	2.63	2.28	2.01	1.79	.243
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.84	2.42	2.18	1.91	.298
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.53	2.20	2.24	2.08	.153
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.68	2.69	2.25	2.53	.140
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	3.11	2.81	2.89	2.70	.143

TABLE D2.6

Deviations from Midpoints for Civilian Groups by Age and Education

	Younger		Older	
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Coll Grads	Non-Grads	Coll Grads	Non-Grads
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	+.02	+.44	+.22	+.53
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	-1.14	-.60	-.86	-.49
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	+.06	+.45	+.34	+.56
MILITARY LEADERSHIP				
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	-.05	+.29	+.38	+.61
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY				
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	-1.09	-.45	-.69	-.33
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	-.07	+.27	+.24	+.45
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	-.32	-.35	+.05	-.08
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	-.20	+.14	-.20	+.41
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	-.39	-.19	-.09	+.20
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER				
Support for Military Intervention	-.33	-.27	-.25	-.38
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	-.24	+.30	+.09	+.61
Vietnam Dissent	-.49	+.01	-.07	+.19
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE				
Support for Amnesty	-.12	+.20	+.45	+.65
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	-.35	+.08	+.33	+.61
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	-.72	-.27	-.32	-.11
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	-.21	-.22	+.29	-.04
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	-.75	-.38	-.48	-.25

TABLE D3.1

Mean Scores for Navy Groups by Career-Orientation and Rank

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Non-Career-Oriented Officers	Non-Career-Oriented Enlisted Men	Career-Oriented Officers	Career-Oriented Enlisted Men	Eta (Adj.)
(N):	(85)	(1134)	(223)	(867)	
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	2.92	2.97	3.91	3.76	.448
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	2.34	1.97	3.26	3.00	.525
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.69	2.36	2.32	2.24	.085
MILITARY LEADERSHIP					
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	2.89	2.65	3.82	3.50	.451
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY					
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.31	2.97	3.27	3.62	.306
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.48	2.45	2.07	2.14	.240
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.45	2.93	1.98	2.15	.386
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.77	3.29	3.14	3.71	.311
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	3.68	3.64	2.83	2.44	.410
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER					
Support for Military Intervention	2.40	2.25	2.93	2.81	.338
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.32	2.68	2.87	3.20	.306
Vietnam Dissent	3.00	2.68	2.31	2.16	.373
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE					
Support for Amnesty	2.22	2.54	1.43	1.53	.458
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.41	2.83	2.23	2.07	.373
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.56	2.23	2.40	1.97	.205
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.54	2.64	2.06	2.16	.276
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.89	2.78	3.07	2.75	.161

TABLE D3.2
Deviations from Midpoints for Navy Groups by Career-Orientation and Rank

	Non-Career-Oriented		Career-Oriented		
THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Officers (.85)	Enlisted Men (1134)	Officers (223)	Enlisted Men (867)	(S.D. All Navy)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	-.09	-.03	+1.01	+.84	(.90)
Perceived Fair Treatment in Services	-.66	-1.03	+.26	+0.0	(1.00)
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	+.32	+.67	+.71	+.79	(.96)
MILITARY LEADERSHIP					
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	-.11	-.35	+.83	+.51	(.99)
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY					
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	-.63	-.03	+.25	+.57	(1.09)
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	+.03	+.07	+.62	+.52	(.69)
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	+.53	+.07	+.99	+.83	(1.03)
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	-.29	+.37	+.18	+.91	(.78)
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. - Pref.)	+.23	+.26	+.85	+1.14	(1.37)
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER					
Support for Military Intervention	-.12	-.30	+.51	+.37	(.84)
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	-.21	+.21	+.44	+.83	(.84)
Vietnam Dissent	-.72	-.26	+.28	+.49	(.69)
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE					
Support for Amnesty	+.26	-.04	+.99	+.90	(1.08)
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	+.10	-.35	+.29	+.46	(.93)
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	-.73	-.30	-.52	+.04	(.77)
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	-.05	-.16	+.51	+.39	(.87)
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	-.51	-.36	-.74	-.32	(.77)

TABLE D3.3

Mean Scores for Army Groups by Career-Orientation and Rank

MILITARY WORK ROLE	Non-Career-Oriented Officers	Non-Career-Oriented Enlisted Men	Career-Oriented Officers	Career-Oriented Enlisted Men	Eta (adj)
N:	(45)	(887)	(194)	(934)	
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.48	3.01	3.92	3.84	.424
Perceived Fair Treatment in Service	2.88	2.15	3.27	3.15	.471
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.30	2.42	2.11	2.45	.085
MILITARY LEADERSHIP					
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3.52	2.55	3.81	3.28	.432
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY					
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	3.42	3.19	3.71	3.84	.286
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.22	2.52	2.14	2.25	.189
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.17	2.89	1.93	2.33	.330
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.36	3.56	3.50	4.04	.305
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. -Pref.)	2.81	3.33	2.43	2.29	.369
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER					
Support for Military Intervention	2.77	2.20	3.08	2.63	.310
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.83	2.85	2.94	3.27	.243
Vietnam Dissent	2.46	2.66	2.23	2.26	.285
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE					
Support of Amnesty	1.68	2.52	1.47	1.66	.197
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.58	2.93	2.39	2.32	.294
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.62	2.28	2.73	2.17	.197
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.62	2.71	2.10	2.14	.341
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	3.21	2.81	3.06	2.74	.138

TABLE D 3.4

Deviations from Midpoints for Army Groups by Career-Orientation and Rank

MILITARY WORK ROLE	Non-Career-Oriented Officers	Non-Career-Oriented Enlisted Men	Career-Oriented Officers	Career-Oriented Enlisted Men	(S.D. All Army)
N:	(45)	(887)	(194)	(943)	
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	+.49	+.01	+ .94	+ .86	.98
Perceived Fair Treatment in Service	- .11	-.80	+ .25	+ .14	1.06
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	+ .69	+.57	+ .87	+ .54	1.02
MILITARY LEADERSHIP					
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	+ .52	-.45	+ .81	+ .28	1.00
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY					
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	+ .39	+.18	+ .66	+ .78	1.08
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	+ .37	-.03	+ .47	+ .33	.76
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	+ .83	+.11	+1.07	+ .67	1.00
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	+ .44	+.68	+ .61	+1.27	.82
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. -Pref.)	+ .89	+.50	+1.17	+1.28	1.34
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER					
Support for Military Intervention	+ .30	-.33	+ .64	+ .14	.90
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	+ .40	+.43	+ .54	+ .94	.82
Vietnam Dissent	+ .06	-.23	+ .39	+ .35	.69
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE					
Support of Amnesty	+ .76	-.02	+ .95	+ .78	1.08
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	- .08	-.43	+ .11	+ .18	1.00
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	- .76	-.34	- .89	- .21	.82
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	- .14	-.25	+ .48	+ .43	.83
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	- .92	-.40	- .73	- .31	.77

TABLE D4.1

Mean Scores for Non-Career-Oriented Military Men and Civilian Comparison Groups

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Non-Career Officers		Younger Coll. Grads	Non-Career Enl. Men		Youth 19-24
	Navy	Army		Navy	Army	
N:	(85)	(45)	(113)	(1134)	(887)	(249)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	2.92	3.48	3.02	2.97	3.01	3.38
Perceived Fair Treatment in Service	2.34	2.88	2.01	1.97	2.15	2.38
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.69	2.30	2.94	2.36	2.42	2.64
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	2.89	3.52	2.95	2.65	2.55	3.07
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY						
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	2.31	3.42	2.03	2.97	3.19	2.48
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.48	2.22	2.55	2.45	2.52	2.53
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.45	2.17	3.34	2.93	2.89	3.52
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	2.77	3.36	2.83	3.29	3.56	3.06
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. -Pref.)	3.68	2.81	4.51	3.64	3.33	4.46
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	2.40	2.77	2.23	2.25	2.20	2.20
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.32	2.83	2.29	2.68	2.85	2.57
Vietnam Dissent	3.00	2.46	2.85	2.68	2.66	2.64
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support of Amnesty	2.22	1.68	2.63	2.54	2.52	2.61
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.41	2.58	2.84	2.83	2.93	2.66
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.56	2.62	2.53	2.23	2.28	2.32
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.54	2.62	2.68	2.64	2.71	2.72
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	2.89	3.21	3.11	2.78	2.81	2.89

TABLE D4.2

Deviations from Midpoints for Non-Career-Oriented Military Men and Civilian Comparison Groups

THE MILITARY WORK ROLE	Non-Career Officers		Younger Coll. Grads	Non-Career Enl. Men		Youth 19-24
	Navy	Army		Navy	Army	
N:	(85)	(45)	(113)	(1134)	(887)	(249)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	-.09	+.49	+.02	-.03	+.01	+.43
Perceived Fair Treatment in Service	-.66	-.11	-1.14	-1.03	-.80	-.71
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	+.32	+.69	+.06	+.67	+.57	+.35
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	-.11	+.52	-.05	-.35	-.45	+.08
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY						
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	-.63	+.39	-1.09	-.03	+.18	-.58
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	+.03	+.37	-.07	+.07	-.03	-.04
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	+.53	+.83	-.32	+.07	+.11	-.49
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	-.29	+.44	-.20	+.37	+.68	+.07
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. -Pref.)	+.23	+.89	-.39	+.26	+.50	-.35
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	-.12	+.30	-.33	-.30	-.33	-.38
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	-.21	+.40	-.24	+.21	+.43	+.08
Vietnam Dissent	-.72	+.06	-.49	-.26	-.23	-.19
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support of Amnesty	+.26	+.76	-.12	-.04	-.02	-.10
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	+.10	-.08	-.35	-.35	-.43	-.16
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	-.73	-.76	-.72	-.30	-.34	-.43
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	-.05	-.14	-.21	-.16	-.25	-.26
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	-.51	-.92	-.75	-.36	-.40	-.48

TABLE D4.3

Mean Scores for Career-Oriented Military Men and Civilian Comparison Groups

MILITARY WORK ROLE	Career Officers		College Grads	Career Enl. Men		Non-Grads
	Navy	Army		Navy	Army	(weighted)
N:	(223)	(194)	(242)	(867)	(934)	
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	3.91	3.92	3.12	3.76	3.84	3.42
Perceived Fair Treatment in Service	3.26	3.27	2.13	3.00	3.15	2.51
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	2.32	2.11	2.79	2.24	2.45	2.50
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	3.82	3.81	3.16	3.50	3.28	3.37
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY						
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	3.27	3.71	2.22	3.62	3.84	2.64
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	2.07	2.14	2.44	2.14	2.25	2.28
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	1.98	1.93	3.13	2.15	2.33	3.27
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	3.14	3.50	2.83	3.71	4.04	3.20
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. -Pref.)	2.83	2.43	4.30	2.44	2.29	4.08
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	2.93	3.08	2.28	2.81	3.63	2.26
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	2.87	2.94	2.44	3.20	3.27	2.85
Vietnam Dissent	2.31	2.23	2.70	2.16	2.26	2.44
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support of Amnesty	1.43	1.47	2.30	1.53	1.66	2.11
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	2.23	2.39	2.50	2.07	2.32	2.25
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	2.40	2.73	2.38	1.97	2.17	2.16
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	2.06	2.10	2.46	2.16	2.14	2.64
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	3.07	3.06	3.00	2.75	2.74	2.77

TABLE D4.4

Deviations from Midpoints for Career-Oriented Military Men and Civilian Comparison Groups

MILITARY WORK ROLE	Career Officers		College Graduates	Career Enl. Men		Non-Grads (Weighted)
N:	Navy (223)	Army (194)	(242)	Navy (867)	Army (934)	
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	+1.01	+.94	+.13	+.84	+.86	+.47
Perceived Fair Treatment in Service	+.26	+.25	-.98	0.0	+.14	-.55
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	+.71	+.87	+.20	+.79	+.54	+.49
MILITARY LEADERSHIP						
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	+.83	+.81	+.17	+.51	+.28	+.40
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY						
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	+.25	+.66	-.88	+.57	+.78	-.40
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	+.62	+.47	+.09	+.52	+.33	+.33
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	+.99	+1.07	-.12	+.83	+.67	-.25
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	+.18	+.61	-.20	+.91	+1.27	+.24
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. -Pref.)	+.85	+1.17	-.23	+1.14	+1.28	-.06
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER						
Support for Military Intervention	+.51	+.64	-.28	+.37	+.14	-.30
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	+.44	+.54	-.07	+.83	+.94	+.40
Vietnam Dissent	+.28	+.39	-.28	+.49	+.35	+.08
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE						
Support of Amnesty	+.99	+.95	+.18	+.90	+.78	+.36
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	+.29	+.11	0.0	+.46	+.18	+.26
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	-.52	-.89	-.51	+.04	-.21	-.22
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	-.05	+.48	+.05	-.16	+.43	-.16
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	-.51	-.73	-.62	-.36	-.31	-.33

TABLE D4.5

Deviations from Mean Scores (of Respective Civilian Comparison Groups) for Military Groups by Career-Orientation and Rank

	Non-Career Oriented				Career Oriented			
	Officers		Enlisted Men		Officers		Enlisted Men	
MILITARY WORK ROLE N:	Navy (85)	Army (45)	Navy (1134)	Army (887)	Navy (223)	Army (194)	Navy (867)	Army (934)
Perceived Military Job Opportunities	-.11	+.52	-.46	-.40	+.89	+.90	+.38	+.47
Perceived Fair Treatment in Service	+.37	+1.00	-.47	-.26	+1.30	+1.31	+.56	+.74
Perc. Discrim. Against Women & Blacks	+.24	+.62	+.27	+.21	+.46	+.66	+.25	+.05
MILITARY LEADERSHIP								
Perc. Competence of Military Leaders	-.07	+.62	-.46	-.57	+.72	+.71	+.14	-.10
MIL. INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY								
Preference for Higher Mil. Spending	+.31	+1.56	+.55	+.80	+1.18	+1.67	+1.10	+1.35
Role of Mil. in Society Perc. as Neg.	+.10	+.49	+.12	+.01	+.55	+.45	+.21	+.04
Perc. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	_.84	+1.10	+.56	+.59	+1.08	+1.13	+1.06	+.89
Pref. Mil. (Vs. Civilian) Influence	-.07	+.64	+.28	+.60	+.37	+.81	+.61	+1.01
Adequacy of Mil. Infl. (Perc. -Pref.)	+.64	+1.31	+.63	+.87	+1.13	+1.44	+1.26	+1.38
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER								
Support for Military Intervention	+.22	+.68	+.06	0.0	+.82	+1.01	+.70	+.47
Pref. for U.S. Military Supremacy	+.03	+.61	+.13	+.32	+.49	+.57	+.40	+.48
Vietnam Dissent	-.21	+.54	-.06	-.03	+.54	+.65	+.39	+.25
ISSUES IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE								
Support of Amnesty	+.38	+.87	+.06	+.08	+.80	+.76	+.60	+.41
Oppos. to Unquest. Mil. Obedience	+.44	+.27	-.18	-.28	+.28	+.11	+.18	-.07
Oppos. to Obedience in My Lai-type	-.04	-.12	+.12	+.05	-.03	-.47	+.26	-.01
Preference for "Citizen Soldiers"	+.16	+.07	+.09	+.01	+.47	+.42	+.56	+.59
Pref. Wide Range of Views Amg. Svcmn.	+.27	-.12	+.14	-.10	+.09	+.07	+.02	+.04

TABLE D5.1

Mean Scores on Military Versus Civilian Influence Items for Civilian Groups by Age and Education

		All	Younger		Older		
BATTLEFIELD TACTICS	(N):	Civilians (1677)	Coll Grads (113)	Non-Grads (640)	Coll Grads (127)	Non-Grads (797)	Eta^2
Perceived		(3.91)	4.25	4.00	3.80	3.82	.096
Preferred		(3.93)	3.85	3.82	3.88	4.04	.090
CHOICE OF NEW WEAPONS							
Perceived		(3.46)	3.78	3.60	3.40	3.30	.116
Preferred		(3.44)	3.06	3.35	3.17	3.62	.155
MILITARY PAY LEVELS							
Perceived		(2.77)	2.82	2.94	2.48	2.69	.101
Preferred		(3.02)	2.83	3.01	2.62	3.12	.118
FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS							
Perceived		(2.96)	3.15	3.12	2.72	2.83	.106
Preferred		(2.68)	2.16	2.66	2.20	2.85	.196
NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE							
Perceived		(2.90)	2.73	3.19	2.37	2.77	.158
Preferred		(2.85)	2.27	2.80	2.30	3.05	.191

TABLE D5.2

Mean Scores on Military Vs. Civilian Influence Items for Army Groups by Career-Orientation and Rank

	Non-Career Oriented		Career-Oriented			Total
BATTLEFIELD TACTICS	Officers (45)	Enlisted Men (899)	Officers (193)	Enlisted Men (932)	Eta^2	Army
Perceived	3.62	3.85	3.30	3.41	.161	(3.59)
Preferred	4.67	4.27	4.69	4.67	.227	(4.50)
CHOICE OF NEW WEAPONS						
Perceived	2.44	3.03	2.23	2.44	.226	(2.68)
Preferred	3.93	3.78	4.04	4.28	.216	(4.03)
MILITARY PAY LEVELS						
Perceived	1.51	2.39	1.38	1.84	.274	(2.03)
Preferred	3.40	3.55	3.39	4.07	.231	(3.76)
FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT						
Perceived	1.80	2.54	1.40	1.99	.280	(2.17)
Preferred	2.47	2.95	2.77	3.61	.284	(3.22)
NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE						
Perceived	1.47	2.65	1.34	1.98	.307	(2.20)
Preferred	2.31	3.23	2.58	3.57	.241	(3.31)
TOTAL						
Perceived	2.17	2.89	1.93	2.33	.330	
Preferred	3.36	3.56	3.50	4.04	.305	
ADEQUACY	2.81	3.33	2.43	2.29	.369	

TABLE D5.3

Mean Scores on Military Vs. Civilian Influence Items for Navy Groups by Career-Orientation and Rank

	Non-Career Oriented		Career Oriented			Total
BATTLEFIELD TACTICS	Officers (86)	Enlisted Men (1133)	Officers (223)	Enlisted Men (874)	Eta^2(adj)	Navy
Perceived	3.45	3.88	2.83	2.97	.319	(3.42)
Preferred	4.06	4.22	4.58	4.51	.180	(4.36)
CHOICE OF NEW WEAPONS						
Perceived	3.23	3.15	2.58	2.32	.287	(2.78)
Preferred	3.36	3.57	3.90	4.05	.227	(3.77)
MILITARY PAY LEVELS						
Perceived	1.74	2.35	1.63	1.69	.279	(2.01)
Preferred	2.71	3.28	3.09	3.81	.266	(3.44)
FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS						
Perceived	2.14	2.79	1.60	2.00	.327	(2.35)
Preferred	2.02	2.66	2.25	3.20	.297	(2.80)
NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE						
Perceived	1.70	2.51	1.22	1.76	.325	(2.07)
Preferred	1.70	2.73	1.88	2.98	.277	(2.70)
TOTAL						
Perceived	2.45	2.93	1.98	2.15	.386	
Preferred	2.77	3.29	3.14	3.71	.311	
ADEQUACY	3.68	3.64	2.83	2.44	.410	

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This report presents findings from three nationally representative samples: (1) civilians surveyed in early 1973; (2) Navy personnel surveyed in late 1972 and early 1973; (3) Army personnel surveyed in late 1974 and early 1975. Each of the surveys used the same basic 16-page self-administered questionnaire.

The survey findings reveal differences in values and attitudes about the military among different civilian and military subgroups. In particular,

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19. (Continued)

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Vietnam
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20. Abstract (Continued)

career-oriented military men differed substantially from their civilian counterparts; these career men showed more positive views of military job opportunities and leadership, support for higher levels of military spending and influence, a somewhat "hawkish" view of foreign policy, and a high value placed on "obeying orders without question."

The research indicates that, if present practices for recruiting and retaining military personnel are continued, there is likely to be a gradual trend toward a more career-oriented military and a corresponding tendency toward a narrower "pro-military ideology" within the services. The report also suggests some steps which could be taken to arrest and even reverse the trend.